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 ABSTRACT 
 This thesis examines questions about long-only commodity investment performance 
compared to underlying commodity performance. Recent returns have been nothing short of 
disappointing to investors. A divergence in price has developed between some commodity funds 
and the observed price of the underlying commodities. Previous studies suggest these differences 
are caused by a specific scenario within the futures market where the slope of the term structure 
is positive and holders of futures must roll futures to a higher priced future contract. The 
explanation herein dispels these conclusions and finds that the main driver of returns to futures is 
a premium associated with a commodity market. This evidence is presented both graphically and 
mathematically through a decomposition of the futures returns. Furthermore, this study uses 
historical returns to demonstrate that returns to static long commodity investments are not likely 
to generate the investment returns widely expected in recent years. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Commodities as an asset class are in a league all their own. They do not generate income 
like a stock or a bond through dividends or coupon payments and their capital appreciation is not 
based on earnings growth or returns on capital investments. The price of a commodity is 
determined by the supply and demand of the market. Investment companies, such as the 
Vanguard Group, have come to view commodities as a potentially valuable alternative 
investment that should be considered in any serious discussion about the portfolio mix for 
investors (Stockton, 2007). However, not everyone shares the favorable view of investor’s recent 
diversification into commodity investments. Black (1976) warns, “Commodity contracts, 
however, are not included in the market portfolio. Commodity contracts are pure bets, in that 
there is a short position for every long position.” This mirrors work by Hardy (1940) who argues 
that the futures market is a gambling casino. Both suggest that futures are not capital assets and 
are simply mediums for betting on price.  
Despite these warnings, commodity futures markets rose from relative obscurity a decade 
ago to become a common feature in today’s investing landscape. The size of investments has 
grown from around $50 billion in early 2005 to over $300 billion by 2010 as displayed in Figure 
1. Why the sudden interest in moving capital into this area? Investors seek diversification 
through the low correlations commodity investments offer to traditional asset classes and 
potential income from risk premiums. These commodity investments include Exchange Traded 
Funds (ETFs) that track broad commodity indices as well as those focused on particular market 
segments, such as agriculture. Large institutional investors generally gain exposure to the 
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commodity “space” through direct holdings of futures contracts as well as the use of over-the-
counter derivatives and swaps (Irwin and Sanders, 2011).  
Investors have been encouraged by a wave of academic research which has promoted the 
rush into commodities. Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006) cite equity-like returns to commodity 
futures portfolios and tout risk premiums as an income generator; this undoubtedly contributed to 
the surge in commodity-linked investments. However, returns to commodity index investments 
have generally disappointed since the initial surge of investments during 2004-2007. For 
example, Sanders and Irwin (2012) document that the iShares S&P GSCI Commodity Index 
Trust declined in value over the five years ending September 2011 with a capital loss of 39.6%. 
The puzzling aspect of this poor performance is that it occurred at a time when the overall trend 
in commodity prices was generally upward. Table 1 shows the average performance over the 
past five years for commodity-linked investments in the form of exchange traded funds. The 
weighted average total return for these investments is -40% over the five year period. 
As noted above, a divergence has developed between the observed spot prices of an 
individual commodity and the returns available to investors in futures through ETFs. These 
instances can be observed across a number of commodities and in many cases the divergence 
suggests investors are under performing the spot price of the commodity. It is especially 
demoralizing for investors who witness the depreciation of their holdings as the observed spot 
prices of the underlying commodities have been in an uptrend. Comparing investment 
performance to a spot price target is resulting in disappointing returns to investors’ long-only 
commodity investments. 
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1.2 The Problem 
The crude oil market, and specifically the crude oil ETF, shows how investments in crude 
oil have performed recently. The crude oil ETF, USO, is designed to give investors exposure to 
daily price changes of the front month crude oil futures contract. The USO was launched April 
10
th
, 2006 at a price of $68.02 when the crude oil implied spot price on that day closed at $68.31. 
By December 31, 2012 the price of crude oil implied spot price had risen to $91.51 while the 
closing net asset value (NAV) of the USO had fallen to $33.37, displayed in Figure 2. Investors 
are perplexed by the simple observation of the gap between implied spot prices and the value of 
the investment. How could they have lost money when spot prices have risen over the time 
period? 
 A similar pattern has developed in the corn market. Since the existing corn ETF does not 
cover the time period of April 2006 to December 2012, a long futures investment strategy can be 
used to measure the performance of a strategy that mimics the USO.
1
 This strategy reflects 
holding a long position in front month corn futures and rolling before contract expiration. In this 
case, the corn implied spot strategy on April 10, 2006 had a value of $2.35. By December 31, 
2012 the value of the implied spot price for corn rose to $6.95 and the value of the long only 
strategy rose to $3.75 as displayed in Figure 3. While the investor’s performance was positive, it 
still did not keep pace with the appreciation in spot prices and investors would have been left 
wondering why they made so little money. 
 What is the reason behind the divergence that is developing between observed spot prices 
and long-only commodity futures investment performance? It is widely documented that a 
                                                          
1
 The long strategy involves buying and holding front month Chicago Board of Trade corn futures contracts rolling 
before first notice day. There is a 0.45% annual expense (same as the USO) deducted from returns. It does not 
account for a liquidity cost of rolling futures contracts or any interest accumulation an ETF may earn. 
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phenomenon known as “contango” is to blame, as demonstrated in Bjerga, Loder, and Robinson 
(2010). Contango is a market structure where spot prices are at a lower price than subsequent 
futures prices, i.e., a positive sloping term structure. The losses are said to occur during the “roll” 
process when long futures are sold and the subsequent futures are purchased at a higher price. 
When a futures market is in contango fund managers claim they are forced to roll or switch their 
long positions from relatively lower priced nearby futures contracts to relatively higher priced 
deferred futures contracts. The process of rolling from low-priced nearby to high-priced deferred 
contracts is said to create a negative “roll yield.” It is now widely-accepted within the investment 
industry that the roll yield is a key part of the return generating process in commodity index 
investments. Fund managers have even attempted to minimize the so-called negative roll-yield 
attributed to contango with “enhanced” index products that avoid contango markets (e.g., 
Barclays Capital, 2010). 
While a majority of writers, periodicals, and academics take the contango argument 
surrounding the roll yield as fact, three studies have challenged the conventional wisdom that the 
term structure of a futures market has a direct impact on long-only futures investment returns. 
Burton and Karsh (2009) and Sanders and Irwin (2012) rely on informal arguments. 
Bessembinder et al. (2012) provide a formal theoretical analysis based on the standard cost of 
carry model of futures pricing. However, their empirical analysis is limited to only one market—
WTI crude oil futures.  
Another view on poor returns to commodity investments involves risk premiums and 
“financialization.”2 Hamilton and Wu (2012) estimate risk premium in crude oil futures and 
                                                          
2
 Domanski and Heath (2007) labeled “financialization” of commodity markets as the increase of nontraditional 
participants during the recent decade after documenting the increased activity of financial investors in commodity 
markets 
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document a flipping in risk premiums around 2005 which could have negative impacts on 
investor’s returns. Further, they suggest that this flip could be a result of financialization where a 
large influx of long-only index investment coming into the futures market could cause these 
changes. Their analysis covers the period between 1990 and 2011. The time period of their study 
coincides not only with the USO time period, but also during the expansion of commodity 
investment and the explosion of commodity index funds. Hamilton and Wu (2012) hypothesized 
that the large capital movements into the crude oil market essentially cannibalized returns by 
“bidding away” any risk premium available to a long holder of the commodity to the point that 
the premium may turn negative. Within the crude oil futures market, they find significant 
changes in risk premia starting in 2005 as the volume of futures contracts began its ascent. Their 
results are limited to one market. If their findings are consistent across all markets, a direct 
negative effect on investors will exist due to index fund investing. 
1.3 Objectives 
The objective of this thesis is to investigate the disappointing returns to commodity index 
investments by specifically analyzing the components of returns for individual futures markets. 
First, the model of Bessembinder et al (2012) is used to concisely demonstrate that the popular 
discussion around “contango” and “roll yields” is a fantasy. The model clearly shows that the 
returns to long-only futures positions are independent of the carry or term structure of futures 
market. Next, daily futures prices are used over 2006-2012 in four markets—WTI crude oil, 
corn, gold, and natural gas —to calculate implied spot prices and estimate the components of 
futures returns. This analysis focuses on explaining the apparent performance gap between the 
spot price level and ETF prices. Then the same analysis is expanded to show the performance of 
the remaining 19 commodities in the study over the 2006-2012 time period. The final part of the 
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empirical analysis, motivated by Hamilton and Wu (2012), seeks to determine whether risk 
premiums have declined in recent years with the “financialization” of commodity futures 
markets. 
1.4 Data and Methodology 
The period analyzed is January 1, 1960 to December 31, 2012, from which a number of 
sub-periods are used. The primary sub-period is from April 10, 2006 to December 31, 2012 
which is the life of the USO and extends the analysis in Bessembinder et al (2012). Another sub-
period of analysis will be from January 1, 1990 to December 31, 2012 which will include a break 
after December 31, 2004 for the financialization and risk premium tests corresponding to the 
Hamilton and Wu (2012) sample period. The 23 commodities in the study include: Brent Oil, 
WTI Crude Oil, RBOB Gasoline, Heating Oil, Natural Gas, Copper, Gold, Silver, Cocoa, Coffee, 
Sugar, Cotton, Corn, KCBT Wheat, CBOT Wheat, Soybeans, Soybean Meal, Soybean Oil, Oats, 
Rough Rice, Live Cattle, Feeder Cattle, and Lean Hogs. This mix of commodities was chosen 
from available futures on the commodities in the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (GSCI) as 
well as additional contracts from the Sanders and Irwin (2012) study which add Oats, Rough 
Rice, Soybean Meal, and Soybean Oil.
3
 Moreover, these commodities provide a range of the 
more popular (by volume) futures contracts in a variety of sectors to allow analysis of a large 
scope of contracts. 
The study requires futures data for all the commodities. Futures settlement prices from 
the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), Kansas City Board 
                                                          
3
 Gas Oil was dropped from the GSCI list and Lumber from the Sanders and Irwin (2012) list due to data gathering 
issues. 
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of Trade (KCBT), and the Inter Continental Exchange (ICE) were gathered from the Commodity 
Research Bureau (CRB). Closing prices for the USO ETF were collected from Bloomberg. 
 For the analysis, individual commodities are used since they are the contributing factors 
to the poor returns displayed in Table 1. First, applying the data to the model developed in 
Bessembinder et al (2012) will derive a series of the daily cost of carry between futures 
expirations. Using the series of the cost of carry with the time series of futures data, a time series 
of implied spot prices will be calculated. With a series of implied spot prices, the series of daily 
costs of carry, and by knowing the days between expirations, a daily ex post spot premium can 
be derived to show the daily performance above or below the expectations projected by the 
futures term structure. Returns to a spot investment and returns to a futures investment can then 
be presented using the components derived above. The decomposition of futures returns is the 
primary methodology associated with answering the research questions for this thesis. 
 In order to accurately demonstrate the falsity of the contango argument, a theoretical 
pricing curve will be used for a given day to show how the components of the model interact 
with one another. Furthermore, the mathematical relationships will be highlighted as another 
method for proving that term structure and futures returns are independent of one another. Next, 
decomposing the returns to spot and futures using implied spot prices, cost of carry, and ex post 
premium derived from the model, it will be shown how the component for the cost of carry is the 
primary contributor to the performance gap. The same components will be used in analyzing the 
performance of the set of commodities over the life of the USO ETF (2006-2012). Finally, ex 
post spot premiums will be used as the primary estimator for risk premium to identify any 
declines in risk premium in recent years. The analysis will be expanded to longer time periods to 
note impacts on risk premium over time. 
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1.5 Overview 
The thesis has the following structure. Chapter 2 contains the review of relevant literature 
associated with the cost of carry model, risk premium, and commodity investment performance. 
Chapter 3 contains information about commodity investments and further background for the 
underlying theory of futures returns. Chapter 4 includes the methodology, empirical methods, 
and the data. Chapter 5 presents results and discussion. Finally, Chapter 6 provides a summary 
and conclusions. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
Studies in publications and journals are reviewed in this section and divided into four 
parts – Theory of Cash and Futures Markets, Theory of Normal Backwardation, Conventional 
Wisdom of Long-Only Commodity Performance, and Challenges to Conventional Wisdom. The 
‘Theory of Cash and Futures Markets’ will provide a background for the theoretical relationships 
between cash and futures. The ‘Theory of Normal Backwardation’ section describes the 
evolution and debate surrounding the existence of risk premium in futures markets. The ‘Long- 
Only Commodity Investment Performance’ section reviews recent studies which discuss returns 
to long-only investment portfolios as well as studies which support the contango argument as the 
cause of poor returns. The final section, ‘Challenges to Conventional Wisdom’ reviews the 
studies which stand opposite the conventional wisdom. 
2.2 Theory of Cash and Futures Markets 
The cash market is the physical side of the commodity market. The “cash” or “spot” 
market is the place where a participant who is acquiring a commodity on a specific date would 
go to purchase it on that day.
4
 Spot transactions are made between physical handlers, 
merchandisers, and producers who will have to transport or store the good. Physical transactions 
are done over-the-counter through spot (now) or forward (later dated) transactions and are capital 
intensive because payment must be made in a timely manner for the entirety of the purchase. 
This is in contrast to the futures market where delivery is made or received at a later date. 
                                                          
4
 This paper will refer to the market for immediate purchase and pick up as spot. 
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Futures are standardized contracts to buy a specific amount of a physical commodity at a 
specified date in the future. Futures prices reflect the expected cash price at a time in the future 
(at their expiration). The price of the spot commodity and the futures must equal each other in 
the delivery month, stated by Hieronymus (1977). The theoretical reason is that the cheapest 
source of supply would be bought and the expensive sold until any difference was eliminated.
5
 
Futures contracts at expiration should reflect spot prices in one of two ways. One, in a physical 
delivery settlement system, futures prices should converge to spot prices at expiration. Or two, in 
a cash settled system, futures final settlement price is based on the contract’s value at the end of 
the last trading day (Paul 1985,pp 272).
6
 
There exists a cost to carry a storable commodity over time; a holder must pay someone 
for storage, pay for insurance, and interest. The link between two consecutive futures prices is 
the “carrying charge” as stated by Working (1948). For example, if the June WTI Crude Oil 
Futures price is $90.10 and the July is 90.30, then the carrying charge would be $0.20 per barrel. 
This is a positive return to storage known as “contango”. However, a negative return to storage 
can occur if the June price is above the July price. This market structure is considered “inverted”, 
or in “backwardation.”7  
Since spot and futures prices have a relationship where futures prices become spot prices 
during the delivery period as convergence occurs, there has to exist a fundamental relationship 
between the two prices over time which creates a limit to how cheap spot can be compared to 
                                                          
5
 If the cash price is higher than futures (and they are essentially the same commodity once futures enter the delivery 
process) then the users would buy futures and stand for delivery. If futures are higher than cash, users would buy 
cash, sell futures, and deliver into the futures. 
6
 The value is based on a formula using cash prices. 
7
 This paper will refer to an inverted market term structure as backwardation and a positive term structure (or carry) 
as contango. Backwardation is not to be confused with “Normal Backwardation” which is the theory developed in 
Keynes (1930). 
11 
 
futures. This is called the “no-arbitrage cost of carry.” As cited in Bessembinder et al (2012), the 
theory represents the marginal storage cost in positive and negative slope environments. The cost 
of storage on a specific day is the forgone interest and other storage costs.
8
 The difference 
between the spot price and the futures price cannot be greater than the costs of storage otherwise 
a risk free arbitrage would exist. An arbitrageur could buy and store the physical commodity in 
the spot market while instantaneously selling futures. Carrying the physical and delivering it into 
the futures during the delivery window would make a risk-free profit. Furthermore, as futures 
prices are expected future spot prices, the difference between two futures prices has a maximum 
spread called “full carry” where the same risk free arbitrage would exist if the spread was wider 
than the storage costs over that time period. A participant could buy and take delivery of the first 
future and carry the commodity to be delivered into the second future, again earning a risk-free 
profit.
9
 
Since the cost of carry can be viewed as the difference in two consecutive futures prices, 
the cost of carry can easily be calculated and used to project a spot price. Hence, spot and futures 
can be linked through this no arbitrage cost of carry relation as shown in Bessembinder et al 
(2012): 
  ( )      
   , 
where    is the futures price at time t,    is the spot price at time t,    is the cost of carry at time 
t, and m is the number of days until futures expiration. Note that    contains the costs of storage 
and at times these may be offset by “convenience yields” when the cost of carrying becomes 
negative (-  ). Convenience yields are simply the yield from holding stocks of a particular good 
                                                          
8
 Storage costs include the physical price paid to store, insurance, and any other costs.  
9
 This does not consider the costs of margin requirements needed to hold a short futures position. 
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(Kaldor 1929). When convenience yields exceed the physical cost of storage and foregone 
interest, the market enters an inverse or backwardation. Convenience yield acts as an extra real 
option value assigned to holders of physical commodities. In the case of negative cost of carry 
structure, it would appear valuable for a holder of spot to sell at high prices because the market is 
forecasting lower prices in the future; however, there is value associated with owning the 
commodity during tight supplies for liquidity purposes. A graphical representation of cash and 
futures will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
2.3 Theory of Normal Backwardation 
Keynes (1930) and Hicks (1939) develop a theory of futures pricing based on risk 
transfer within commodity markets. Producers of a commodity seek to hedge their price risk 
associated with holding the commodity. For example, a corn farmer will sell futures to lock in a 
price at harvest; this sale is a form of insurance guaranteeing the producer a specific price at 
harvest (abstracting from basis risk). While speculators provide the insurance by buying the 
futures from the hedger, they demand a premium for taking on the risk. Thus, speculators 
demand a futures price which is less than the expected spot price at maturity. Simply stated, 
speculators are paid a premium from hedgers for bearing the risk associated with holding a 
position ahead of maturity according to the theory. During the time when Keynes and Hicks 
developed the theory, most hedging was done from the short side, so this “risk premium” was 
paid to the long speculator. To earn the risk premium provided by hedgers, speculators would not 
necessarily need to hold the futures till expiration. As expiration nears, the price of the futures 
would begin to appreciate toward the expected spot price (as previously stated futures become 
spot at expiration) and a profit may be realized in advance of expiration. 
13 
 
 Questions can be raised on the direction of hedging activities today which drive the 
potential for risk premium. Are large commodity investors long while commercial hedgers short, 
on average? Aulerich (2012) studies the returns to traders surrounding the existence of risk 
premium by analyzing positions of traders for 12 agricultural commodity markets from January 
2000 to September 2009.
10
 During this study the author states, “Consistent with expected 
investment behavior, index traders have over 400,000 net long days and only 10,000 net short 
days. Commercial traders are about 2 times more likely to be short than long and noncommercial 
traders are 1.5 times more likely to be long than short.” (Aulerich 2012, pp99) This shows the 
overall flows of positions in commodity markets around passive long investment and hedging 
activities, showing that it is safe to assume commercial hedgers are generally short while 
commodity index traders are generally long. 
There has been much debate over the existence of normal backwardation or risk premium 
in futures markets.
11
 The bulk of the following evidence is in opposition to normal 
backwardation and risk premiums. The two camps are divided by supporters of the existence of 
risk premiums and those who do not support the theory.  
2.3a Support of Risk Premium 
Working (1948) goes beyond the theory of normal backwardation and cites “…in price 
data subsequent to 1896, of some ‘downward bias’ in futures prices of wheat and corn, but not of 
oats; but for the ten-year period prior to 1896, the indicated bias was in the opposite direction for 
all grains.” Houthakker (1957) finds evidence of normal backwardation when speculators stick to 
                                                          
10
 The data is gathered from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s Large Trader Reporting System which 
contains end-of-day reportable positions for each trader ID. 
11
 Risk premium in the context of this paper refers to the excess built in premium over or under the expected price of 
the asset in the future. This differs from the risk premium in finance literature which has to do with the amount an 
asset’s return is in excess of the risk-free rate of return. 
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the long side of the market in the long run. He used estimates of profits and losses by applying 
end of month positions to monthly averages of daily closing prices for Chicago grains and New 
York cotton. Cootner (1960) claimed that speculators profit on both sides of the market, long and 
short. For example, he assumes speculators “go short before the harvest, continue that short 
position until net hedging by large traders reaches a peak, and then go long, they consistently 
make a profit.” In short, whether risk premium is paid by sellers or buyers is a function of the 
hedger’s positions.  
More evidence of risk premiums is found in Bessembinder (1992) where he finds 
“…substantial evidence that mean returns to nonfinancial futures are nonzero when conditioned 
on net hedging. “ The average returns to 16 nonfinancial futures are influenced by a degree of net 
hedging from 1967 – 1989 which is similar to the Cootner (1960) explanation that hedging has 
an impact.  
These studies are examples of evidence of risk premium that exists in commodity futures 
markets. The support exists, but is generally contingent on other factors in the market which 
drive the flows of price. In the next section, examples of studies which conclude risk premiums 
are small to nonexistent in these markets will be presented. 
2.3b Rejection of Risk Premium 
Telser (1958) studies the theory of normal backwardation by analyzing the behavior of 
futures prices near delivery. The presence of normal backwardation suggests futures prices 
display an upward trend as the delivery date approaches. This is tested by Telser using wheat and 
cotton futures from 1926 through 1954 by analyzing month-to-month changes. He finds that 
futures prices display no trend. The evidence fails to support the theory of normal 
15 
 
backwardation. This is an important point in the debate against the existence of risk premium in 
futures markets.   
Further studies have also come to similar conclusions as Telser’s 1958 work. Rockwell 
(1967) compares the Theory of Normal Backwardation with “forecasting theory” which suggests 
speculators returns depend on their ability to forecast market price and not an embedded 
premium. He examines U.S. commodity futures from 1947 to 1965. After measuring profit flow, 
he concluded there is a lack of evidence in support of normal backwardation and results support 
profits being generated through forecasting abilities. Dusak (1973) analyzes risk premium with 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model from the angle that risk premiums should depend on “the extent 
to which the variations in prices are systematically related to variations in the return on total 
wealth.” She analyzes systematic risk for wheat, corn, and soybeans from 1952-1967 and 
concluded systematic risk is close to zero as well as the realized holding period returns were 
close to zero. Hartzmark (1987) investigates returns to individual accounts of ‘hedgers’ and 
‘speculators’ by calculating returns from end of day positions and price changes for a set of nine 
markets from July 1, 1977 to December 31, 1981.
12
  He concludes speculators on average lose 
money and hedgers are more profitable. Kolb (1992) studies 29 commodity futures from 1957-
1988 and tests hypothesis to support the normal backwardation theory. Hypotheses include: 
futures returns should be positive, futures prices prior to expiration should be below the terminal 
futures price, and futures prices should be lower the longer the time remaining until expiration. 
He concluded that most commodities exhibit no risk premium, and “normal backwardation is not 
a general feature of futures markets – normal backwardation is not normal.” Finally, Telser 
                                                          
12
 Markets include CBOT Wheat, KCBOT Wheat, MGEX Wheat, pork bellies, live cattle, feeder cattle, T-bonds, 
and 90-day T-bills. 
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(2000) concludes, “It appears on this evidence that normal backwardation as a theory of futures 
should be respectfully interred.” 
The above was a sample of the ongoing debate; there are many studies which attempt to 
come up with the final answer of whether risk premia exist. Competing studies and research still 
leave the table open for debate, however, a majority of the evidence suggests risk premiums are 
zero or close to zero over time. So what drives long only investment returns? 
2.4 Long- Only Commodity Investment Performance and the Conventional Wisdom 
 Some studies find evidence of positive returns to long- only portfolios and they will be 
discussed herein. Bodie and Rosansky (1980) construct an equally weighted cash-collateralized 
portfolio of commodity futures from 1950-1976 and find statistically significant returns similar 
to the S&P 500, annual excess returns of 9.8%. This would support the case for the existence of 
risk premiums. Furthermore, Fama and French (1987) also find marginal evidence of statistically 
significant returns to 21 commodities from 1967-1981. Interestingly, when commodities are 
combined into portfolios, they perform better and exhibit evidence of risk premiums. Reasons 
portfolios receive better performance include a diversification affect and benefits of rebalancing 
which will be discussed in detail in later sections. Portfolios require a rebalancing, where they 
must sell appreciated positions and continue to purchase positions that have depreciated. Some of 
the returns may be biased as these actions can be considered trading and not be a part of a long-
only return. This situation is highlighted by Erb and Harvey (2006), “simply rebalancing alone 
can be a source of statistically significant returns.” 
 Some key academic research has furthered these claims of “equity-like” returns to 
portfolios of commodities. Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006) was a notable driver in the recent 
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explosion of commodity investments in recent years. They find annualized returns to an equally 
weighted portfolio of commodity futures of 10.7% which rebalances on a monthly basis. 
Furthermore, they find the returns to an equally weighted buy and hold portfolio of commodities 
to be 11.5%. They attribute these results to risk premium and state that during their sample 
period “commodity futures risk premium was about equal in size to the historical risk premium 
of stocks (the equity premium) and exceeded the risk premium in bonds.” Their decision to 
analyze commodity performance on a portfolio level is to “help reduce the noise inherent in 
individual commodity data.” They go on to say that rebalancing matters and state it acts as an 
embedded trading strategy. Yet, they still conclude a positive risk premium similar to stocks 
when measuring the returns of a rebalanced, equally weighted portfolio. 
 Erb and Harvey (2006) also find positive returns to long-only commodity investments, 
however, they state that the “average return of the average commodity futures contract is not 
statistically different from zero.” Continuing that there is no risk premium in these markets and 
diversification is key in “turning water in to wine.” Erb and Harvey do caution a naïve move to a 
simple long strategy as a source of return. And they state that the portfolio returns do not build a 
case for the existence of risk premia in commodity futures. So what else is a potential return 
generator for investors? 
 Conventional wisdom of returns to long futures holders suggests that the slope of the 
term structure dictates returns through “roll yield” and general directional momentum of the 
market. Roll yield is the part of returns that come from changing from one futures contract to the 
next before the expiration of the current holdings. Since these long-only investments do not take 
delivery, rolling to the next contract is necessary. Erb and Harvey (2006) highlight this case by 
explaining that “roll returns” are a part of futures returns and that the term structure drives the 
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roll returns. If the term structure is downward sloping, it is suggested that selling the higher 
priced future and rolling to  (buying) the lower priced subsequent future generates a positive 
return. The opposite is true for an upward sloping term structure. This is highlighted in Bjerga, 
Loder and Robinson (2010), “When they buy the more expensive contracts – more expensive 
thanks to contango- they lose money for their investors. Contango eats a funds seed corn, 
chewing away its value.”  
 Some indexes advertise roll returns as profit centers and a reason for investment. The 
GSCI Excess Return Index is an example of one such index touting roll return as a money 
making strategy. Erb and Harvey (2006) have suggested the two sources of returns to commodity 
investments are diversification and “skewing portfolio exposure toward commodity futures that 
are likely to have positive roll or spot returns in the future.” The idea of roll returns as a potential 
profit or loss center seems common place in much of the literature. 
2.5 A Rebuttal to Conventional Wisdom 
Sanders and Irwin (2012) as well as Bessembinder et al (2012) argue against the 
contango argument for poor returns. Sanders and Irwin (2012) takes a broad look at commodity 
investment performance over the long-run. Bessmembinder et al (2012) examine participation 
around the roll period for the USO to test if predatory trading practices contributed significantly 
to the losses the fund has had against the spot prices of crude oil. The models used in 
Bessembinder et al (2012) will be discussed in detail in the methodology section of this study as 
they are the main tools used in this study.  
Sanders and Irwin (2012) are skeptical of the sudden flows into commodity investments 
as moves to capture returns through risk premium. They state that the views of the financial 
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investment community seem to side with returns through risk premium; however, for 
commodities futures markets existence of risk premiums is highly debatable as shown in 
previous sections. Continuing, they also side with what was previously suggested regarding the 
existence of risk premium being small to zero for commodity futures. Furthermore, they cite that 
returns to futures market portfolios depend on portfolio weighting schemes which is consistent 
with Erb and Harvey (2006). They analyze long only commodity futures investments over 50 
years and find the returns to individual commodity futures investments are zero on average. The 
returns to 20 individual commodities are calculated for annualized geometric returns by decade 
using monthly returns. They find on average for all the commodities in their study that the 
annualized geometric returns at -0.5%.  
Sanders and Irwin (2012) outline the argument of the contango impact to returns stating 
that it is commonly reported that buy-and-hold investors steadily lose money in a contango 
environment. To dispel the contango argument, Sanders and Irwin (2012, pp 8) state, “The 
balance of evidence suggest that static long-only positions in individual futures markets have an 
expected return of zero. The idea that the ‘return to roll’ is a realized futures return is a fiction.” 
Beyond this dismissal, they state how the misconception can be confused with the roll of a single 
asset like a stock. However, commodity futures may not be assets at all and surely one future is 
not the same as another. Futures are unique in their delivery time as associated with the spot 
price and a May contract is not the same as a July contract for example. They equate these 
differences to rolling between equity postions in GM and Ford common stocks. Furthermore, 
some contracts are completely different crops all together, such as the September versus the 
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December corn contract.
13
 Finally, it is stated that profiting from switching between commodity 
futures contracts would violate market efficiency in that it would create a “virtual money 
machine.” 
It is suggested in Sanders and Irwin (2012) that while roll returns do not contribute to 
futures returns, the structure of the market may be suggestive of future price movements. For 
example, backwardation generally occurs with higher prices as a result of low stocks. The 
backwardation is a signal that prices may continue higher due to low supply. Some funds are 
structured around this idea to attempt to capture the movements. Finally, Sanders and Irwin 
(2012) analyze returns to portfolios over the 50 years from 1960 through 2010 for 10 markets. 
They found geometric annual excess return of 3.6% per year; however, this was not statistically 
different from zero. They go on to produce diversification returns over this time period and 
expand the study to include 20 markets. They find the diversification return to be around 3% per 
year for the 20 commodities. The diversification return is important because it is the basis for the 
returns realized in Erb and Harvey (2006) and Gorton and Rouwenthorst (2006). The 
diversification return to the portfolio can be greater than the average geometric return of the 
components.
14
 
Bessembinder et al (2012) studies market activity around large ETF rolling periods in the 
crude oil market. The study analyzes whether there is “predatory trading” or “sunshine trading” 
practices that occur around the USO roll (Brunnermeir and Pedersen 2005; Admati and 
Pfleiderer 1991). Most of the paper is used to determine that sunshine trading is more likely and 
roll execution costs are under 40 basis points per roll. Bessembinder et al (2012, pp36) view on 
                                                          
13
 December futures contracts represent the new crop in corn futures, where corn grown over the summer months 
can be delivered into. 
14
 This is simply used to demonstrate the theory of returns to portfolios. See literature on modern portfolio theory for 
more information as the scope of this paper will not incorporate this. 
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roll returns is as follows, “… the cost of carry has no direct implication for futures returns…” 
continuing “In particular, the fact that rolling a futures position in a contango market involves 
buying the second contract at a price higher than the selling price for the expiring contract has no 
direct implication for returns to roll strategies.” Bessembinder et al use the cost of carry model to 
decompose the returns to futures and spot market for crude oil to answer questions around the 
performance of the USO to observed spot price. The authors conclude that futures price 
appreciation will be less than spot price appreciation in contango markets. While execution costs 
for rolling contracts exist, they do not explain the entire story of the divergence. Furthermore, 
crude oil futures is a fairly thin market as far as size and depth of bid and ask in temporal spreads 
is concerned.
15
 It is reasonable to think that markets with larger bids and asks which have smaller 
price changes throughout the roll will limit the execution costs (likewise, thinner markets exist 
where these costs may be larger).
16
  
2.6 Financialization of Commodity Markets and Risk Premiums 
Domanski and Heath (2007) labeled “financialization” of commodity markets as the 
increase of nontraditional participants during the recent decade after documenting the increased 
activity of financial investors in commodity markets. Irwin and Sanders (2012) expand on this 
idea and show large increases in volume and open interest around 2004. The evidence is very 
strong that a structural change came about; electronic trading helped promote the ease of entry 
into these markets. It also became much easier for market participants to open futures accounts 
and have access to these markets. As technologies developed, institutions and investment banks 
                                                          
15
 Temporal spreads are the time spreads between two futures expirations, for example, January and February. The 
exchange has guaranteed spreads for rolling these types of products so both sides are guaranteed to be filled at the 
same time. Participants may execute the first and second leg individually at the risk of missing one of the sides, but 
larger funds tend to use the exchange traded calendar spreads to complete rolling activity. 
16
 During the corn roll periods, spreads may trade within a one cent range with bids and offers in the tens of 
thousands. 
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began creating products to offer more exposure to these markets. The commodity funds, and 
more commonly ETFs (discussed more in Chapter 3) came about. Around this same time Gorton 
and Rouwenhorst (2006) made their famous claims of equity-like returns which undoubtedly 
added to the increased volume. The increased volume and creation of long commodity funds has 
increased liquidity and, potentially, risk premium could have decreased. A decrease in risk 
premium in theory would shrink returns to long futures holders. Large inflows of long positions 
would essentially “bid away” any risk premium in the market and a large enough increase in long 
positions could cause the premium to flip to where the short is being compensated as opposed to 
the long. 
 Hamilton and Wu (2011) suggest a flip in risk premium is possible due to a 
financialization effect. They analyze the crude oil market over two periods from 1990 -2004 and 
2005-2011. The timing of the study coincides with the financialization documented in Irwin and 
Sanders (2012). Hamilton and Wu (2011, pp 31) conclude “… increased participation by 
financial investors in oil futures markets may have been a factor in changing the nature of risk 
premia in crude oil futures contracts.” The variable in the study associated with performance of a 
long investor for the time period 1990-2004 is positive at 0.0037 (suggests a long investor on 
average makes money over the period) and significant at the 5% level. This same variable for 
2005-2011 drops to a value of 0.0028 and is no longer significant and the investor on average is 
not making money. More liquidity in the futures markets as a result of financialization benefits 
the market by decreasing the cost of execution and a drop in risk premium would cause the price 
of hedging to be cheaper. Irwin and Sanders (2012) explain how the increase in market 
participation can shift the supply of storage to the right causing the price for storage to decrease 
and thereby increasing the amount of inventory to help buffer supply shocks. Overall, more 
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liquidity and narrowing of bid/ask spreads provides truer price discovery in the market as well as 
improved information transmission.  
2.7 Summary  
 This chapter reviewed the literature from journal articles and publications to provide an 
in depth background for this study. The main areas of focus include the history of risk premiums 
starting from Keynes (1930) theory of normal backwardation, matters of the ongoing debate of 
risk premiums, discussions around long-commodity performance and conventional wisdom, 
opposition to the conventional wisdom, and finally studies around financialization and risk 
premium. 
 The main takeaways from this chapter are as follows. An understanding of the inner 
workings and relationships that exist between cash and futures markets is needed to grasp the 
concepts which apply to the empirical model. Specifically, the concepts linking cash to futures 
and futures to futures through the no arbitrage cost of carry are relevant. The theory of normal 
backwardation by Keynes (1930) is the backbone for the idea of risk premium that has been 
debated for years. The theory involves an embedded compensation to a bearer of risk who holds 
a futures contract over time. The bulk of the evidence is in opposition to the existence of risk 
premiums in commodity futures markets.  
The conventional wisdom surrounding long-only commodity investment performance as 
launched by Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006) holds that commodity investments may enjoy 
equity-like returns. Erb and Harvey (2006) state that diversification is the key to returns in 
commodities. And yet another source of returns as widely accepted by market participants comes 
from “roll yield” or the swapping of futures contracts before expiration. All of these are 
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suggestive of potential positive returns to commodity investment, and any negative returns are 
blamed on the contango structure of the market. These assumed realities by many market 
participants are rebutted by Sanders and Irwin (2012) and Bessembinder et al (2012).  
Finally, the impacts of financialization and risk premium as argued by Hamilton and Wu 
(2011) in the crude oil market set the foundation for another possible source of poor returns. 
Financialization is the participation in commodity markets by non-traditional participants from 
the financial investing world. The cause of the negative returns is thought to stem from index 
fund investing which may “bid” away risk premiums. 
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3. COMMODITY INVESTMENTS 
3.1 Introduction 
 This chapter describes different types of commodity investments and how they compare 
to each other. The purpose herein is to review the specific types of investments used in this study 
and demonstrate differences relative to other potential options in the commodity investment 
world. Topics discussed include physical versus futures investments, commodity index products 
(managed funds and ETFs), and an explanation of a futures pricing curve to show where returns 
to these investments come from in theory. 
3.2 Physical versus Futures Investments  
Investors have different vehicles at their disposal to gain exposure to commodity price 
moves. The most basic strategy is to physically purchase the commodity. However, this is capital 
intensive and requires some additional cost to store the commodity. For example, an investor in 
corn would need to buy physical bushels from an elevator. To make the investment worthwhile, 
they would need to purchase thousands of bushels because the price per bushel is low and corn 
prices fluctuate only a few dollars per year.
17
 Since investors on average would need to purchase 
many bushels in order to capture decent returns on price movements, they require a facility to 
store the physical bushels as most cannot bring the grain home, or put it in a bank. Grain 
elevators offer a place to store physical commodities at a cost. The cost to an investor for storage 
is the physical price charged to store, interest, and insurance. Transporting and storing in the 
physical market requires large capital commitments and can be very cumbersome, especially for 
smaller investors.  
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 One bushel of corn is approximately 56 lbs and corn prices have rarely ever been over $8.00 per bushel. 
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A better investment than a physical purchase is to buy a standardized futures contract 
such as the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) corn futures contract. Futures require less capital 
than physical and still provide the same exposure to price moves, because they are leveraged 
through use of margin. To gain an idea for the exposure possibilities in the futures market 
consider the contract specifications: a corn futures contract has a size of 5000 bushels (127 
metric tons), initial margin requirement $2,700 per contract, and a price movement of a one cent 
is equivalent to $50.
18
 Furthermore, investments in futures are beneficial in that they avoid 
incurring the storage costs. However, futures markets inherently price in these storage costs in 
the futures term structure as will be shown later in the cost of carry discussion. Futures 
investment can be volatile and risky to some investors as there are risks of margin calls and 
capital ruin, but for larger investment funds, they are ideal for gaining exposure to price 
movements. 
3.3 Commodity Index Products 
Commodity indexes capture price movements of commodities by holding a large amount 
of any combination of physical holdings, futures contracts, and options contracts. At their most 
basic level, commodity indexes can hold a basket of commodities; some hold many different 
markets in a portfolio style investment, while others may hold only one. The originators of these 
indexes sell shares of the index to the investment community which allows investors of all sizes 
to grab a piece of the market. As noted by investopedia.com, the indexes are often listed on 
exchanges so investors can gain easier access to the commodity without entering futures markets. 
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 The physical equivalent cash requirement for 5,000 bushels at a price of 5$/bushel would be $25,000 compared to 
a futures position at $2,700. In this example, the investor would require one tenth the money for the same exposure 
and without the hassles of physical storage. Source: Chicago Mercantile Exchange Website. 
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Smaller investors may want to stay out of futures markets for the reasons explained above.
19
 
Commodity indexes have different strategies, not only can they hold one or many commodities, 
but they can also be managed in different ways.  
Some funds hold a portfolio of equally weighted commodities such as the Thompson 
Reuters Equal Weight Commodity Index (CCI). This index holds 17 commodity futures and is 
continuously rebalanced.
20
 The act of rebalancing can increase (or decrease) the performance for 
some funds which means rebalancing can be looked at as an embedded trading strategy. For 
example, the Standard & Poor’s Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (GSCI) does its rebalancing 
once a year. The process many funds use is to rebalance each holding to a percent of the total or 
a weight. For example, if a total fund of $10 million allocates 10% (or $1 million) to a gold 
position, and the gold position value is $1.1 million at rebalancing (after a gain of 10%), then 
$100,000 worth of the gold position will be sold and realized as a profit. On the other side, losing 
positions will be added to. If oil is 10% of the fund and its value drops to $900,000, then another 
$100,000 will be purchased to rebalance the holding to 10% of the fund.
21
 It should seem 
obvious that these actions mimic a trading strategy. If commodities are mean-reverting in any 
way, this strategy will always generate money because winners are realized and losses are never 
taken and money is always added to these positions. Since the rebalancing incorporates this 
“trading strategy”, this study looks at individual long-only investments as a way to accurately 
measure performance over time of the true commodity which excludes this embedded trading 
strategy.  
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 Source: http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/commodityindices.asp 
20
 Rebalancing is the process of resetting the number of assets within a fund to their previously disclosed amount or 
weighting, this can occur at different times depending on the fund (weekly, monthly, quarterly, etc). 
21
 Other funds may rebalance differently depending on strategy; this is just one example for purposes of 
demonstration. 
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Other funds will hold a different weighting of commodities such as the GSCI. The GSCI 
is one of the largest indexes by assets and serves as a benchmark for investment in the 
commodity markets; it holds 24 different commodities and a mix of futures and physical assets.
22
  
Appendix C shows the 2013 holdings for the S&P GSCI, with the largest holdings in the energy 
sector at almost 70% of the allocation. The GSCI has multiple indexes derived from the Spot 
Index, which is the raw index based on the value of the holdings (the price value of all 
components). The GSCI Excess Return Index incorporates “…the returns of the S&P GSCI Spot 
Index as well as the discount or premium obtained by ‘rolling’ hypothetical positions in such 
contracts forward as they approach delivery”.23 The GSCI Excess Return Index is an example of 
an index that is counting the roll return as a real return. 
Other funds use specific strategies to attempt to capture a positive roll return. The 
Deutsche Bank Liquid Commodities Index Optimum Yield (DBLCI-OY) is designed to 
“maximize potential roll returns by selecting, for each commodity, the futures contract with the 
highest implied roll yield.” This fund will seek out futures with term structures in backwardation 
to capitalize on the roll yields offered and minimize exposure to contango markets so roll yield 
losses are smaller. Other funds exist that perform similar results and may be of some interest for 
further analysis. 
3.4 Exchange Traded Funds 
An easy way for investors to gain exposure to commodity markets is through Exchange 
Traded Funds (ETFs). ETFs are designed like mutual funds in that they hold specific assets 
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 The GSCI Spot Index has over $40 billion under management. Source: http://us.spindices.com/performance-
overview/commodities/sp-gsci 
23
 Other indexes include S&P GSCI Total Return Index and the S&P GSCI Futures Price Index. Information on 
these can be found in the GSCI Methodology document, page 8. Source: 
http://www.spindices.com/documents/methodologies/methodology-sp-gsci.pdf 
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(stocks, bonds, commodities, etc), but have better liquidity because they trade like a stock. They 
are attractive in this feature because investors can get in and out multiple times in a day (as 
opposed to mutual funds which only trades at the end of the day), and they are low cost. Their 
popularity has grown in the last decade and there are many different ETFs to cover all sorts of 
different strategies. According to etfdb.com since the first ETF was launched in 1993 the number 
of ETFs available has grown to 1,400.
24
 ETFs also offer average investors access to the tools 
institutional and professional investors use without having to pay additional commissions by 
trading futures through the bigger brokers or posting margin. The ease of access has also 
contributed to the increase in demand for commodities as part of portfolios.  
The USO is from the family of ETFs within the United States Commodity Funds.25 The 
USO at its peak in early 2009 had over $4.2 billion under management, which equated to 90,000 
contracts of crude oil futures (Bessembinder et al 2012). The USO specializes in providing 
exposure to price movements for West Texas Intermediate Crude Oil Futures by holding the 
front month crude oil futures contract. To avoid the delivery process, the fund rolls the holdings 
over a four day period starting two weeks from contract expiration.
26
 With thousands of contracts 
to roll, the fund can run into costs associated with liquidity in the market during roll time. 
Bessembinder et al (2012) estimates a cost of approximately 4.4% per year or 37 basis points per 
roll. Additionally, the USO has a management fee of .45%, a portion of the holdings are in zero 
coupon treasury bills and some cash instruments, and the USO is able to generate a small portion 
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 The first ETF was the SPDR S&P 500 (SPY). The 1,400 ETFs include all different strategies and asset classes; 
they are not bound to just long commodity ETFs. 
25
 http://www.unitedstatescommodityfunds.com/ 
26
 Prior to March 2009, the roll was completed on one business day (source: USO webpage). Now the USO rolls 
their contract holdings from front month to the next deferred futures contract over a four day period starting two 
weeks from contract expiration. 
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of income from margin accounts.
27
 The basic strategy of the USO will be mimicked for some of 
the analysis here, and it is important to know the inner workings when referring to the 
performance in Figure 2. Not all ETFs are designed with this basic long holding strategy. Some 
use leverage through swap agreements to offer exotic strategies to investors such as double (or 
triple) exposed ETF. For example, ProShares Ultra Short 20+ Year Treasury (TBT) is double 
short long duration treasury bonds, and thus offers twice the normal leverage for double 
exposure to a basket of short treasury securities with 20 plus years of maturity (strategy includes 
swap agreements).
28
 Others will combine holdings of more than one commodity, for example the 
Dow Jones- UBS Livestock Total Return (COW) which is designed to track both lean hogs and 
live cattle.  
3.5 Theory Behind the Futures Pricing Curve 
 This section will cover the graphical representation of the theory used throughout the 
paper for the breakdown of returns to futures and spot investments in order to show the returns 
commodity investments can expect to receive. A graphical representation in Figure 4 will 
provide the visual example. The first chart of Figure 4 represents a hypothetical pricing curve on 
a given day, January 1, for a market in contango. The returns will be explained for this scenario 
first, followed by the returns in the backwardation scenario which the second chart represents.  
 Spot prices are linked to the futures price through a no- arbitrage cost of carry as 
explained in Chapter 2. This cost of carry is represented as    over the annual curve from 
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 Source: USO webpage 
28
 These leveraged funds typically invest in derivatives such as “swap agreements” with other financial entities at 
predetermined terms of leverage. For example in a double leveraged case, the counter party would agree to pay $2 
for every $1 the fund gains and the fund would pay $2 for every$1 it loses. The swap agreements allow the fund to 
leverage at multiples of the notional value. Further, through swaps, the funds can borrow securities to sell for short 
exposure in a particular market. Funds may also use futures and/or options. Additional information on TBT can be 
found at http://www.proshares.com/funds/prospectus.html?ticker=TBT 
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January 1 to December 31 at 10%. Spot prices at 100 on January 1 can be expected to appreciate 
to the futures price at 110 over the course of the year. In this scenario, assuming no risk premium 
is in the market, a return to a holder of the spot from January 1 to December 31 would be zero 
after incorporating the cost paid to physically store the spot commodity. In other words, with no 
risk premium, the expected spot price in the future (December 31) is the futures price of 110, 
which perfectly follows the cost of carry. The expected return to a futures investor, assuming no 
risk premium in the market would be zero as well. The futures investor who purchases on 
January 1 at 110 (point A) would expect to receive 110 at expiration at year end. 
 If a positive risk premium is introduced, represented by   , then the returns to both spot 
and futures are affected. Spot prices can be expected to appreciate above the cost of carry and a 
holder of spot would earn a positive return after paying the cost associated with storing the 
physical commodity. A spot investor purchasing on January 1 at 100, would expect a return of 5 
to 115. On the other hand, the futures investor would also realize a positive profit. A futures 
investor purchasing at 110 on January 1 (point A) can expect the price to appreciate to 115 by 
December 31 (point B). Since spot and futures prices converge to the same price, it is shown that 
both returns gain the same amount of benefit from the risk premium. To summarize, in a positive 
risk premium environment, the spot investor can expect a profit over and above the cost of carry 
and the futures investor can expect to purchase the futures under the expected future spot price 
and also realize the same profit over the same time period. This represents the theory of normal 
backwardation. 
 If a positive risk premium is possible, it is reasonable to consider the effects of a negative 
risk premium. In this environment, the expected returns to a spot investor purchasing on January 
1 at 100 would be under the cost paid to carry the commodity and they would expect spot to be 
32 
 
105 at the end of the year. This is an expected net loss of 5. For the futures investor purchasing at 
110 on January 1, they would expect futures prices to fall in a negative risk premium 
environment to 105 and would realize a loss of 5. In this scenario, the spot price cannot keep 
pace with the cost of carry and spot investors can expect to lose, and the futures are upwardly-
biased related to future spot prices.  
 The second chart represents a similar curve over the same time period as the first chart 
and with the same spot price, but for a backwardated market. Assuming no risk premium, a spot 
investor purchasing from 100 can expect a return to match the depreciation of the cost of carry to 
the futures price of 90 on December 31.
29
 Similar to the contango environment, the expected 
return to a futures investor with no risk premium would be zero, purchasing at 90 (point A) and 
expiring at 90.  
 The introduction of a positive risk premium benefits the spot investor who purchases spot 
at 100 and would expect a depreciation of only 5 to 95 (point B). This would outpace the 
depreciation to spot and the spot investor can expect a positive return over what is forecasted by 
the cost of carry. The futures investor will also have a positive expected return. A futures 
investor purchasing on January 1 at 90 (point A) can expect the futures price to rise to the expect 
spot price at 95 (point B) and expects a profit of 5. As was the case in the contango market, the 
spot investor can expect a profit over and above the cost of carry and the futures investor can 
expect to purchase the futures under the expected future spot price and also realize the same 
profit over the same time period. 
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 It would appear economically disadvantageous for an investor to hold spot while the price is decreasing. The 
difference in this should be explained in part by convenience yield which is discussed in Chapter 2. 
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 On the negative premium scenario, the expected return to the spot investor falls faster 
than the depreciation to the cost of carry. In this case, the expected return from purchasing spot 
at 100 would be 85 (point B). The effect is the same to the futures investor. An investor in 
futures purchasing on January 1 at 90 (point A) would have an expected return of 85 (point B) at 
expiration on December 31, a loss of 5. 
 The discussion here involves the expectations as an ex ante analysis of the pricing curve 
on a given day as suggested by the theory. The analysis that follows calculates the returns ex post 
on a daily basis. The major points to take away from this section are as follows: the risk premium 
(  ) is the main driver of the returns to futures, the risk premium effects both the spot returns and 
futures returns by the same magnitude, and regardless of the slope of the term structure, futures 
are a downward biased estimate of futures spot prices in a positive premium environment and an 
upward biased estimate in a negative premium environment.  
3.6 Summary 
 This chapter examined the options investors have for investments in commodities. 
Investors have different vehicles at their disposal to gain exposure to these markets. The most 
straightforward tools investors choose to use are index funds and ETFs. The important take away 
is how these products work compared to other investment options. Since the later analysis in the 
thesis is done on individual commodities in an ETF-style investment, it is important to 
understand ETFs and how individual commodities fit into the indices. 
  This chapter also highlighted the important features of the USO ETF which will be used 
throughout the paper as a metric for investment performance and contributes its strategy to the 
long futures strategy developed herein for comparable analysis across an array of commodities. 
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The idea of using the same strategy is to keep the analysis consistent throughout. USO is used 
because it is very straight forward and demonstrates the divergence with the spot price extremely 
well. 
 Finally, this section discussed the basic theory behind the futures pricing curve on a given 
day. The major point is to demonstrate how the components of returns are broken out and 
displayed in a graphical setting to understand their function. Specifically the importance of the 
risk premium component (  ) and how it drives returns for both spot and futures to the same 
degree is key. The next important aspect of the discussion is that the returns to futures are 
independent of the slope of the term structure.  
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4. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
4.1 Introduction 
 This section outlines the model developed in Bessembinder et al (2012) to explain crude 
oil ETF performance, the data used in the study, and the procedure used to decompose and break 
down components of commodity returns. First, an introduction to the model itself and the 
variables denoted throughout the paper. Second, an in-depth presentation of the empirical 
process to build a time series of implied spot prices from which the rest of the analysis is 
presented. Then, a discussion on the limitations of the model in non-convergence. Finally a 
description of the data applied to the model.  A detailed description of the methods of calculation 
and the process for all the tests is also presented in this section. 
4.2 Summary of the Cost of Carry Model 
Let    represent the spot price at date t and   ( ) represent the futures price at date t for 
delivery at t+m, with     the per period cost of carry which includes interest and other storage 
costs. The cost of carry model can be expressed as follows: 
( )    ( )      
    
Using (1) for delivery dates t+m and t+n (m>n), the proportional cost of carry per period can be 
expressed as: 
( )      
   [
  ( )
  ( )
]
(   )
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Using the cost of carry from equation (2) and spot prices observed at times t and t+1 the return 
premium Ut is obtained: 
( )        [
    
   
  
]  
   can be considered the ex post return premium. It is made up of any price shock resulting from 
changes in daily supply and demand and risk premium (if any) on a given day. Empirically, 
averaging    over a long enough time period will remove the supply and demand shocks and the 
average    can then be viewed as an estimate of the risk premium.  
 The above equations can be used to derive a calculation for spot return and futures return 
when applying equation (1) to t and t+1 for returns (defining             ): 
( )    [
    
  
]           
( )    [
    (   )
  ( )
]       (   )    
The return to a spot investor (4) is broken down to the cost of carry plus any ex post 
premium, as shown in Figure 4. In the environment where no risk premium is available the 
expected return on spot investment is the cost of carry. This can be positive or negative 
depending on the term structure.   
The return for a futures investor (5) is broken down to the change in the cost of the carry 
and any ex post premium. In the environment where no risk premium is available and a static 
term structure, the futures price is expected to perfectly predict the appreciation in spot prices 
and expected returns are zero. An increase in the cost of carry benefits futures returns. It is 
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important to note equation (5) lacks the term    which mathematically shows how futures returns 
are independent of the slope of the term structure. 
 In order to derive equations (4) and (5) for spot and futures return, first, equation (1) must 
be applied to futures dates t and t+1: 
(6)   [
    (   )
  ( )
]    [
     
    (   )
   
  ( )
] 
Once equation (6) is defined, applying equation (3) and  C to the right side of equation (6) 
allows the following derivation to yield equation (5): 
           (   )         ( ) 
                (   )    ( )    (   )    (   ) 
                     (   )    ( )    (   ) 
              (   )     ( )  (   )  
                 (   ) 
  [
    
 
    
]    (   )   
(5)   [
    (   )
  ( )
]       (   ) 
Deriving equation (4) from equation (3) for spot return is as follows: 
(3)     [
    
   
  
]  
                  
 
(4)         [
    
  
] 
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4.3 Empirical Procedures 
In order to answer the research questions a decomposition of futures returns and its 
components will be obtained using the previous theoretical model. Once obtained by applying 
the data for each commodity, the components will be broken out as an annualized average over 
the sample period. The components include appreciation in implied spot price (      ), cost of 
storage (term slope,   ), ex post spot premium (  ), and futures return (    (   )  ). With 
this information the story of the divergence between observed implied spot price and the 
investment performance can be explained, analysis of risk premium and returns across markets 
can be done, and the question involving financialization and changes in risk premium can be 
addressed. 
The first step in the procedure after gathering the data is calculating a series of implied 
spot prices from the futures settlements. Taking the first (n) and second (m) deferred futures 
settlement prices on a given day t as well as the number of days between futures contract 
expirations (m-n), and applying them to equation (2) gives the daily cost of carry for time t.
30
 
Starting in Table 2, the calculation for the first row under    uses   ( ),  ( ), and (   ) as 
follows: 
     
   [
   
   
]
(  )
 = .0332% 
This process is repeated down the column to create the series of   . Once the cost of carry is 
calculated for time t, applying it to equation (1) with the second (m) deferred future   ( ) and 
the number of days (m) from expiration will project the implied spot price for time t. 
                                                          
30
 The number of days between expirations (m-n) for this study is calculated using trading days. A more precise 
calculation could be done using calendar days since storage would be paid on weekends as well, however, this 
should not significantly alter the results. 
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       (  )
 = 99.04  
 This is essentially discounting back the cost of carry from the futures price at time t+m to the 
spot at time t which will give the implied spot price. This process is repeated for each day to 
come up with a time series of daily implied spot prices.  
 In order to maintain an accurate and consistent measurement for spot prices across all 
commodities, implied spot prices are used. Issues arise when attempting to collect observed spot 
prices. Some of the data collected may misrepresent the true market because most end of day 
bid/ask could miss actual traded levels in illiquid physical markets. Furthermore, there may be 
confusion about which specific physical locations to collect the most accurate spot prices for the 
different commodities. In general, issues around data quality and availability of observed spot 
prices are the main reasons to use implied spot in lieu of the actual.   
 To demonstrate the accuracy of using implied spot prices compared to available observed 
spot prices, a plot of the difference between implied spot and actual spot for CBOT corn, wheat, 
and soybeans is presented in Figure 5. The period is from January 2010 through February 2012 
reflecting the period of available data for actual spot following the episodes of non-convergence 
(which will be discussed in greater detail in a later section). The plots are presented as the 
difference of implied spot and actual observed spot price as a percentage of actual observed spot 
price. The spot prices are gathered from the mid market of bid/ask spreads at the deliverable 
locations for each commodity.
31
 The plots for corn and soybeans show the implied prices 
overstate observed cash prices an average of less than 2% the value of the underlying 
commodity. While implied prices for wheat overstate observed cash prices an average of 4% the 
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 Observed spot prices for corn and soybeans are obtained from North Peoria on the Illinois River and wheat from 
Toledo, OH. These commodities have fairly relatively liquid spot markets at these locations. 
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value of the underlying commodity. Overall, outside of the periods of non-convergence, the 
implied spot and actual spot are quite close in these markets. 
 
Once the time series is created for daily implied spot prices, equation (3) can be applied 
to calculate the daily ex post spot premium using consecutive implied spot prices. 
 ( )        [
      
     
]  = 2.00% 
This process takes the log return of the quotient of implied spot price on day t+1 (    ) and the 
expected spot price for day t+1 as compounded by the cost of carry (   
  ). If the actual implied 
spot is greater than the expected implied spot, then a positive premium is realized and vice versa. 
Again, this premium on a given day consists of supply and demand shocks on that day as well as 
any risk premium in the market. A time series of ex post spot premiums is completed following 
this step. 
Once the average of the time period in question are taken and annualized for each of the 
components, returns can be calculated as follows. Combining annualized average ex post spot 
premium (  ) and the annualized average cost of carry (   ) will provide the average annual 
appreciation to implied spot price for that period as displayed in equation (4). For the return to 
futures, another time series for the change in cost of storage must be calculated between day t 
and t+1. Once that is obtained, averaged, and annualized for the time period the calculation is 
simply the average annual ex post spot premium (  )  plus the product of the average annual 
change in the cost of carry and one day less the futures time to expiration ((   )  ) as shown 
in equation (5).
32
 Similar to the appreciation in implied spot price procedure, the futures return 
                                                          
32
 In order to avoid complexities with counting days, the log return between two futures prices is used for futures 
returns in this study. This is consistent with Bessembinder et al (2012). 
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will show the average annual return to futures for the time period. The components are averaged 
and annualized for the sample period to provide simple metrics for comparison. 
The initial calculations are done on a daily basis to produce a time series for each 
component. For the analysis, averages are taken from the daily time series then annualized by 
multiplying by 250.
33
 A simple average of the components derived is the best estimator for the 
purposes of this paper. 
In order to observe the behavior between observed spot and a tradable strategy for the 
other markets, a strategy was developed to mimic the USO. This is superior to using other 
commodity ETFs because not all the commodities have an ETF, and the ones that do may not 
cover the same time frame as the USO and utilize different strategies than buy, hold, and roll 
front month futures. A “long strategy” was developed for each commodity to stay consistent with 
the USO comparison in both strategy and over the same time frame. Within this long strategy, all 
futures are rolled on the last day before the contract month.
34
 For example, the December corn 
future is rolled to March on the last business day of November. This is done to stay consistent 
across all commodities in the study since all contracts are still traded the last business day before 
the contract month (some terminate this day while others may terminate at a different day during 
the delivery month.  
Returns will be decomposed for 23 commodity markets using the methods above and 
presented in sub-periods over the sample period April 10, 2006 to December 31, 2012. The focus 
is to show how returns have behaved over the sample period as well as display effects of 
financial crisis on ex post spot premiums. Analysis will be done to determine whether risk 
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 250 is a commonly used number for the amount of trading days in a given year. 
34
 An annual expense ratio of 0.45% is taken out the daily returns to incorporate an expense like an ETF. No 
additional fees, expenses, or roll costs are considered (to keep as true to the performance of futures as possible). 
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premiums have declined in recent years. The ex post risk premiums will serve as an estimate of 
risk premium for comparison across the time periods in the Hamilton and Wu (2012), 1990 to 
2004 and 2005 to 2012. Following this analysis, ex post premiums will be presented across a 
longer time frame and broken down by decade to show a different break for the study and 
compare risk premiums across time. 
4.4 Episodes of Non-Convergence 
 One of the major assumptions of the cost of carry model is that spot and futures markets 
will converge at expiration. As documented thoroughly in Garcia, Irwin, and Smith (2011) there 
has been more than a couple occasions where futures markets have failed and resulted in a non-
convergence of spot and futures prices over the years 2005-2011. These instances seem to be 
limited to CBOT corn, soybeans, and wheat futures and KCBOT wheat futures and are most 
dramatic in the wheat markets.  
 The issue arises as highlighted by Garcia, Irwin, and Smith (2011) due to a contract 
feature unique to the futures at the CBOT and KCBOT involving a maximum storage fee set by 
the exchange. Actual storage rates at grain elevators or warehouses are set by the prevailing 
market forces. For example, when stocks are in a surplus the cost of storage is high, and when 
stocks are low the cost of storage is lower. As time moved on, the actual storage fee as 
determined by the market has moved beyond the maximum set by the exchange. A “wedge” 
developed between the actual cost of carrying physical grain and the cost of carrying delivery 
instruments. This phenomenon caused futures prices to settle over the spot price at expiration 
(sometimes up to 35 percent over spot). To compensate, the structure of the futures market 
would move to large contango and sometimes would appear to be past the point of full carry into 
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the first delivery day. The market would force this move due to the artificially low storage rate 
associated with the futures contract. 
 While the events of non-convergence occur over some of the sample periods this paper 
uses, the methods are not changed to compensate for this. The methodology used will be 
sufficient in the analysis to answer the research questions despite the events of non-convergence. 
As actual prices are used, futures returns are not affected by issues of non-convergence. Futures 
returns still give a true amount of return to a strategy holding futures. However, since the futures 
term structure cannot incorporate the actual cost of carry due to the limiting fixed cost of storage 
attached to the shipping certificate or warehouse receipt, the term structure numbers for these 
commodities is underestimated to some degree. The cost of carry during these periods of non-
convergence should be larger than the    reported in the results. Essentially the artificial storage 
rate can limit the size of the spread between two futures and thus can understate the cost of carry 
in this analysis. Since the actual    is understated, the value of    over the same time period 
should be on average over stated. This does not take away from the conclusion offered by the 
results; the results still capture the general story that is happening with returns to commodity 
futures. 
4.5 Data  
The data used in this study are daily closing prices of the front futures contract and the 
deferred futures contract across an array of commodities. The commodities in the study include 
20 storable commodities: Brent Oil, WTI Crude Oil, RBOB Gasoline, Heating Oil, Natural Gas, 
Copper, Gold, Silver, Cocoa, Coffee, Sugar, Cotton, Corn, KCBT Wheat, CBOT Wheat, 
Soybeans, Soybean Meal, Soybean Oil, Oats, and Rough Rice. And three non-storable 
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commodities: Live Cattle, Feeder Cattle, and Lean Hogs. Data were gathered from the 
Commodity Research Bureau (CRB) for the time period January 1, 1960 through December 31, 
2012.
35
 The periods of study include: April 10, 2006 through December 31, 2012 for the initial 
performance analysis which corresponds to the life of the USO. 
Extending the analysis of performance over the long-run uses data broken down by 
decade and only incorporates the futures contracts which have the entire decade worth of data. 
The section of the study that deals with financialization and risk premium shifts uses data over 
the time period January 1, 1990 – December 31, 2012 with a break point at December 31, 2004 
to compare the two sub sample periods analyzed by Hamilton and Wu (2012). 
The set of commodities is derived from a combination of the GSCI and the ones analyzed 
in the Sanders and Irwin (2012) study. The Sanders and Irwin (2012) study adds Oats, Rough 
Rice, Soybean Meal, and Soybean Oil to the mix and does not include Lumber due to a data 
issue. All the commodities in the GSCI which have futures contracts are included (excludes 
Aluminum, Lead, Zinc, and Nickel since they are physical) except for Gas Oil because of 
another data issue. These commodities were chosen to provide a range of the more popular (by 
volume) futures contracts in a variety of sectors to allow analysis of a large scope of contracts. 
4.6 Summary 
 This section summarized in detail the cost of carry model used in the analysis. The model 
was used in Bessembinder et al (2012) to explain crude oil ETF performance. The key 
components the model produces are break downs for appreciation to implied spot price, the cost 
of storage, the ex post spot premium, and futures returns. Using these components, the discussion 
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 Some of the CRB data has periodic missing data on days for some of the commodities, for these circumstances, an 
average between the previous day and the next day was taken to fill in the gap. 
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around contango and roll yields will be dispelled, analysis of the observed performance gap will 
be explained, performance of commodity markets will be presented, and questions surrounding 
the declines in risk premium will be answered. Furthermore, this section highlighted the 
limitations to the model when considering episodes of non-convergence in futures markets.  
This section also presented the CRB daily settlement data which is applied to the model. 
The data included futures contract settlements for all contracts in the study from a variety of 
exchanges and products. The explanation of why this set of commodities was chosen included 
the GSCI Index and previous work in Sanders and Irwin (2012). Moreover, the commodities in 
the study represent a mix of the more popularly traded contracts in different sectors of the futures 
markets. 
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5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1 Introduction  
 Results will be discussed in this chapter and broken into four areas. First, a brief 
summary of why the contango argument is indeed false; followed by the explanation of the 
divergence that has caused the gap between observed spot prices and investments; next, 
discussion of investor performance and ex post risk premiums across markets and time; and 
finally, the evidence around financialization and risk premiums in recent years. Additional 
graphical evidence for all the commodities in the study can be found in the appendices as only a 
few notable commodities are chosen for discussion in the following pages. 
5.2 Contango Argument 
 The contango argument blames the positive sloping term structure for negative futures 
investment returns. The “negative roll yield” purportedly occurs when the holder of the front 
future has to sell their position prior to expiration and purchase the next future at a higher price. 
The “selling low” and “buying high” is said to generate this loss. As Sanders and Irwin (2012) 
and Bessembinder et al (2012) have indicated, this does not appear to be factual. Expression (5) 
for futures returns does not include the cost of carry variable. Furthermore, a graphical depiction 
in Figure 4 shows the effect of risk premium (the driver of futures returns) is the same in 
contango as it is backwardated markets. Finally, from an accounting stand point, the sale of the 
first future closes the position leaving no position for possible gain/loss. Returns only occur 
during the holding periods of contracts, not between them. 
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5.3 Explaining the Gap 
The performance gap is best and most accurately represented by Figure 2, which shows 
the gap between the USO and the spot performance of WTI crude oil. The observation of this 
gap has been a source of disappointment for investors as their expectations lie in matching the 
returns to spot. The gap is not a function of    since    impacts both futures and spot returns 
equally. Hence, the issue is the cost of storage. More specifically, the gap is equal to the 
difference in the appreciation to spot and the futures return. Subtracting equation (5) from (4) 
yields equation (7):  
         -     (   )    =     (   )       (7) 
 The difference between the spot and futures return (the gap) is simply a function of the cost of 
storage. When the cost of storage is positive the futures returns cannot keep up with the 
accumulated appreciation to spot (assuming    <   ). Conversely, when the cost of storage is 
negative (    ), futures returns outpace the spot price.  
 Equation (7) is the calculation for the gap and allows further insight into the behavior of 
the markets and returns. Assuming a zero risk premium, if the cost of carry is positive and static 
(     and    = 0), then spot prices will appreciate while futures prices are unchanged. The 
reverse of this is true for backwardated markets, if the cost of carry is negative and static 
(     and    = 0), then the futures returns will be unchanged while spot prices fall. This is 
represented graphically in Figures 9 and 10. Furthermore, a performance gap will accumulate 
between the spot price and the futures return at a rate essentially equal to the cost of carry 
(assuming the     is zero). For commodities with stable and positive levels of   , the gap will 
persist and grow at a steady rate (as will be shown for precious metals).  
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The returns to futures are independent of the structure of the market; however, as shown 
in the equation, changes in the term structure can affect futures returns. If     is greater than 
zero (moving from backwardation to contango) then postitive returns to futures may occur and 
the gap could narrow. Conversely, in an event when     is less than zero (moving from contango 
to backwardation) then negative returns to futures may occur and the gap could widen. 
The results for crude oil, corn, gold, and natural gas for the sample period April 10, 2006 
through December 31, 2012 can be found in Table 3 to explain the performance gap. Crude oil 
and corn are presented since they were originally shown as examples of the gap. Gold was added 
to show how the relationships between spot and returns are affected with a steady and modest 
positive sloped term structure. Natural gas is an interesting case as it contains some of the most 
violent moves in the study and provides a good display of volatility in a specific market. 
The output for WTI Crude Oil shows an average annualized cost of storage (  ) at 14.1% 
and an average annualized ex post spot premium (  ) at -9.5%. The combination of these two 
yields an appreciation in implied spot of 4.6%. The average annualized one period change in the 
cost of storage (   ) is 2.9%. When combined with    of -9.5%, a futures return of -6.6% is 
shown. Subtracting the futures return of -6.6% from the spot return of 4.6% yields the theoretical 
performance gap between spot and futures prices of an average annualized 11.2%. Which means 
over this time period futures returns, on average, performed 11.2% worse than spot returns. Since 
the USO shows actual performance of this investment, a comparison can be made to the ETF 
return of -10.5%. Subtracting the ETF return of -10.5% from the appreciation of spot of 4.6%, an 
actual performance gap of 15.1% is observed in Figure 2. This is different from the theoretical 
gap of 11.2% because it includes the liquidity costs of rolling at an annualized average 4.4%, 
49 
 
annual management fee of 0.45%, interest accrued through margin, and any timing differences 
with rolling.
36
  
The clearest view of how costs of storage contribute to the gap is the case for gold. 
Storage costs are small and consistent over time with an average annualized (  ) at 2.0%. The 
average annualized appreciation to spot is at 15.5% with an average annualized average futures 
return of 14.3%. The theoretical performance gap for gold is only 1.1% as observed in Figure 6. 
This is due to low, consistent storage costs for precious metals as compared to much higher and 
more volatile costs for other commodities.  
Table 3 also shows the results for corn and natural gas. The corn futures market has 
positive average annualized returns to both spot and futures of 15.9% and 6.6% respectively 
driven by the average annualized    of 6.3%. The theoretical performance gap for corn is 9.3%. 
In contrast to this positive performer, natural gas exhibits some the most drastic numbers in the 
study, the average annualized    for natural gas was a massive -53% while the annual    was 
42.8% contributing to an annualized average -10.2% return to spot and an annualized average -
49.5% return to futures. The theoretical performance gap for natural gas was 39.4% leaving 
investors with a very disappointing investment as shown in Figure 7. 
 The phenomenon of the gap being driven by the cost of carry is shown graphically in 
Figure 8. The chart shows the gap of the cumulative increase in the price difference of crude oil 
implied spot price and the USO share price and the cumulative cost of carry. The cost of carry 
explains the majority of the gap, exactly as theory predicts. In a positive sloping term structure, 
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 Bessembinder et al (2012) cites liquidity costs for rolling futures on a monthly basis is approximately 4.4% per 
year. The long futures strategy for the other commodities do not incorporate a cost for rolling. 
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the futures returns cannot keep pace with the returns to the implied spot. What is driving the 
implied spot appreciation? Can investors earn this return by holding spot instead of futures? 
 The cost of carry can be thought of as the appreciation a spot investor would expect to 
receive for holding the physical commodity over the time period. In the case for crude oil if no 
risk premium is assumed, an investor would expect to receive 14.1% annual appreciation on 
holding physical crude oil over the sample period. However, there is a cost to physically store a 
commodity which is not represented in the spot appreciation, as mentioned in Chapter 3. 
Focusing on appreciation in the spot price is analogous to focusing on gross returns without 
netting out the cost paid to physically store.  
 This is important because futures have the cost of storage embedded in their price as they 
are the expected future spot prices. In a positive carry environment the futures price, by 
definition, is higher than the spot because it has this embedded cost. Assuming no risk premium 
and a static term structure the spot price can be expected to appreciate to the level of the futures 
price. This particular environment returns nothing to the holder of spot after storage costs are 
paid and nothing to a futures holder. In short, comparing futures performance to spot 
performance (without accounting for the cost of storage) is not a valid comparison. This can be 
shown graphically in Figure 9. Comparing investment performance to a target of spot prices in a 
contango structure will always be frustrating to investors as the spot price performance 
represents an unattainable strategy of buying and holding spot without paying storage. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that in a backwardated market, futures performance 
will outperform spot performance on average as shown in Figure 10. Backwardation is rare 
compared to episodes of contango. When it exists, no investor would complain that they appear 
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to be “beating” the market, thus it would remain out of publications. Comparing investment 
performance to a target of spot prices in a backwardated structure will always show investments 
outperforming the target of spot prices. 
With this explanation of the gap, it is important to note a part of Bjerga, Loder, and 
Robinson (2010) where they explain that the spot prices reported on cable business channels are 
“an unreachable benchmark.” They go on to explain that trying to match spot prices with ETF 
investments in contango will kill returns and to purchase spot to avoid this will incur a cost of 
storing spot. This is true, however it is arguable that returns are not being “killed” by contango, 
returns to futures are the returns to futures. Investors should understand that comparing futures 
returns to spot returns is an unattainable benchmark. An investment isn’t “losing” money or 
getting an unfair deal by investing in a passive long strategy, it is earning its fair return. Investors 
appear to desire returns simply unavailable in these markets. It is impossible to earn what is not 
there and directing the blame elsewhere is commonplace in the investment publications. 
5.4 Investor Performance 
 If the comparison to the spot market is irrelevant, what should the investor care about? 
The primary measure of performance an investor should be concerned about is whether the 
investment is above or below the price at which they purchased it. They should not be concerned 
with an “apples to oranges” comparison to the spot price as it is unattainable (without paying 
storage costs). Most investments compare themselves to a benchmark to measure performance 
against the broader market. The issue in commodity futures involves comparison to the spot 
market as the primary benchmark. This is fine to do if the cost of storage is removed from the 
spot price. Once storage costs are removed a valid comparison can be made.  
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 Breaking out ex post premiums will show how investor’s returns are affected. An 
interesting story develops here when the time period is segmented around the financial crisis. 
Table 4 shows the breakdown for all commodities over the sample period of April 2006 through 
December 2012. The sample period is further broken down into three sub-periods: pre-Lehman, 
post-Lehman or during the financial crisis, and after the financial crisis. The pre-Lehman period 
is defined as April 10, 2006 to August 29, 2008. The post-Lehman period is defined as 
September 2, 2008 to December 31, 2009. And the post crisis period is defined as January 4, 
2010 to December 31, 2012. Graphical representation of Table 4 for crude oil, corn, gold, and 
natural gas are shown in Figure 11 and Figure 12 as 12 month moving averages.
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    for crude over the sample period is -9.5%. However, before the crisis the average was 
almost 13%. The crisis period crushed the crude oil returns with an average    of -62%. 
Following the crisis the average moved up to a modest -4%. The movements of    over the 
period are reflected in Figure 11. It is obvious that negative shocks to prices over this period 
substantially diminished the returns to the investor as demonstrated in the annual returns to the 
USO of -10.5%. 
    for corn over the sample period has a similar pattern as crude oil. The main difference 
between corn and crude oil is that corn premiums are positive except for the large -38% during 
the crisis period. Even with the large negative over the crisis period, corn is on average positive 
and investors would show modest average gains as demonstrated in the annual returns to the long 
strategy of 5.2%. Graphical representation of the path of    for corn over the time period is 
shown in Figure 11. 
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 Charts for the ex post premium for the remainder of the commodities over this same time period is presented in 
Appendix B. 
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    for gold over the sample period was 13.4% which was one of the better performing 
commodities in the study. The gold premium benefited during the financial crisis gaining almost 
20% over that time period before falling back to around 13% in the post crisis period. During the 
crisis gold showed a very strong positive    which was most likely directly related to the 
depreciating value of the US dollar at that time which caused positive shocks in the gold market. 
Furthermore, flight to safety trades during the period of high volatility and low confidence in the 
financial system undoubtedly added to these premiums. On average, investors enjoyed 
substantial returns over this time period as the long strategy returned 12.7 % as shown in Table 
3.  
    for natural gas over the sample period was -52.9%. The large negative average 
annualized ex post premium over the sample period was exacerbated during the crisis with    at 
an average -89%. Returns to a long strategy over the sample period are -50.1% as shown in 
Table 3. 
 Some notable additional results from Table 4 include gasoline, silver, sugar, soybean 
meal, and lean hogs. Gasoline has enjoyed a positive average annualized   over the sample 
period of 7.7%, but also had a rough run during the crisis with    being -35% during that sub-
sample. It is interesting that gasoline has been the only positive return producer in the energy 
sector over the sample period. Sugar received a very strong positive    during the crisis of 51%, 
however, prior to the crisis    was -26%. An average 1.5%    over the sample masks the wild 
ride investors would have had for sugar. Soybean meal provided a steady and consistent return 
over the sample period. The    over the period was just over 20% with the sub sample periods 
never falling below 15%. On average, this was the best performer across the commodities in the 
analysis. Lean hogs were one of the worst performers following natural gas, with an average 
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annualized     of -23.9% over the sample period. This was driven by a -59.7%    during the 
crisis.  
Interestingly, the average annualized    over the time period across all commodities in 
the study is -0.7%. All the hype over adding commodity investments does not appear to be as 
beneficial as is documented with virtually no returns on average. When incorporating other costs 
associated with these investments (such as liquidity costs due to rolling, management fees, and 
transaction fees) it is no wonder investors have been disappointed with passive long commodity 
investments. Without additional strategies such as diversification or rebalancing which enhance 
returns, it can be concluded that individual commodity futures returns are zero on average. 
5.5 Financialization and Risk Premiums 
 An alternative explanation for the poor returns to long-only commodity investments is the 
decline or flipping of risk premiums following the financialization of commodity markets after 
2005. Hamilton and Wu (2012) find the “expected compensation from a long position is lower 
on average but much more volatile in the recent data, often significantly negative when the 
futures curve slopes upward.” The authors go on to suggest there has been a change in the nature 
of the risk premium for crude oil futures after 2005. It can be expected that financialization 
would have an affect across all commodities. The results of this study should capture the affect 
to be consistent with Hamilton and Wu’s arguments regarding a flip in risk premia.  
As previously stated, averaging the calculation of    over time will cause the shocks to 
drop out and    can be viewed as ex post risk premium. The average    will serve as an estimate 
for risk premium. Comparing average annualized    across the two time periods segmented by 
Hamilton and Wu (2012), 1990 through 2004 and 2005 through 2012, should provide evidence 
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of risk premia shifts across commodities. If a flip in risk premium exist, it can be expected that 
the average    from a period prior to the financialization would be larger than the period 
following the financialization.  
 The results for the two periods, 1990 through 2004 and 2005 through 2012, for average 
annualized risk premium across all commodities are displayed in Table 5. The average annual 
risk premium between 1990 and 2004 is -0.3% with a t-stat of -0.17 while between 2005 and 
2012 average annual risk premium is 1.0% with a t-stat of 0.38.  Interestingly, risk premiums 
actually increase on average between the two time periods although neither period is statistically 
different from zero.  
When broken down by sector, some interesting things are observed. First, the energy 
sector shows a decline in risk premiums in the second sample of almost 16% with all subsample 
differences less than zero and lead by natural gas. WTI Crude Oil in particular shows a decline of 
-16.4%, although not statistically different from zero with a t-stat of -0.96. This is consistent with 
the findings of Hamilton and Wu (2011). The metal sector shows all increases in risk premium. 
Gold was the only statistically significant commodity with a risk premium of 17.5% and a t-stat 
of 2.18. Silver had a large increase of 19.1% with a t-stat of 1.31. And copper a 7.8% increase in 
risk premium and a t-stat of 0.57. 
 Fourteen of fifteen storable agricultural commodities have positive increases in risk 
premiums. Corn leads the way with the largest change at 14.6% with a t-stat of 1.09, although 
not statistically significant. The rest of the agricultural products are between a 4% and 11% 
increase and none are statistically significant. Coffee is the only agricultural commodity with a 
decline in the second period, as risk premium declined -0.7% with a t-stat of -0.04. The non-
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storables were all in a decline in the second period. Feeder cattle dropped -9.2% with a -1.5 t-stat 
and live cattle was down -7% with a t-stat of -0.87. The leader in the non-storables to the 
downside was lean hogs, down -23.1% with a t-stat of -1.43. 
 This analysis provides no clear evidence that there was a systematic decline in risk 
premiums since 2005 as a function of financialization. The subsample difference between the 
two periods across the range of commodities is not only positive at 1.2%, but also not 
statistically different from zero at a 5% level with a 0.37 t-stat. Since Hamilton and Wu (2012) 
worked only in crude oil market, it seems premature to suggest that a broad effect of 
financialization negatively impacting risk premiums is felt across the commodity space. 
However, it would appear there is something specific occurring in the energy sectors, 
surrounding risk premiums, which was captured in their study. The livestock sector showed the 
same tendency. 
For further perspective on the impact of financialization risk premiums are also computed 
for the same time periods as in Sanders and Irwin (2012). The results for 1960-2012 are found in 
Table 6. The results are broken down by decade and then averaged for each commodity’s life. 
These data are only presented for complete decades. 
 An alternative break for the time period offered for the Hamilton and Wu (2012) study 
can be done between the decades of the 1990’s and the 2000’s. Of the 22 commodities with full 
data for both periods (RBOB omitted), thirteen have increases to risk premium while 8 have 
decreases. There is an increase in average risk premium across all commodities from -3.13% in 
the 1990’s to 2.26% in the 2000’s which again shows no evidence of a negative impact 
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financializtion has on risk premiums.
38
 Interestingly, the energy sector (except for natural gas) 
over this time period has positive changes in risk premiums. 
 Some notable results from Table 6 are as follows. For agricultural commodities, the 
soybean complex has been the best performer over the 50 years. Soybean Meal has an annual 
average    of 6.56% with a 1.54 t-stat and leads the complex. The metals sector, starting in 1980, 
had modest    over their contract’s lives. Copper is the only positive with an annual average    
of 5.46% and t-stat of 1.13. Gold and Silver increases in risk premiums were mostly in the 
2000’s which contributed to some of the best performers in that decade. The energy sector has 
some of the better performance over the life of contracts, although the life of these contracts is 
younger than the others. Gasoline was the best performer with an annual average    of 16.99% 
with a t-stat of 1.22. And Natural Gas was again the worst performer with an annual average    
of -16.9% and t-stat of -1.43. Natural Gas was particularly poor in the 2000 decade when the rest 
of the energy futures gained from an energy boom. Natural Gas premiums were harmed by a new 
technology which benefits the extraction process and caused large negative price surprises. The 
non-storables have been fairly tame over their lifetimes. Lean Hogs has an annual average    of -
4.4% with a t-stat of -0.79. Live Cattle has an annual average    of 4.33% with a t-stat of 1.46. 
And Feeder Cattle has an annual average    of 4.74% with a t-stat of 1.85. Further discussion in 
non-storables will be presented in the next section. 
The premiums across all commodities by decade are notable. The 1960’s saw virtually no 
return with an annual average    at -0.8%. The 1970’s however, saw large premiums enter the 
market with    at an annual average 12.4%. Due to the large run up and volatility in the grain 
and commodity markets in the 1970’s this move it to be expected. The 1980’s saw a bit of a pull 
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 Omitting the RBOB risk premium of 16.99% yields average risk premium across the remaining 22 commodities 
for the 2000’s decade of 1.59%. 
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back with the average    across all commodities -4.91%. And the 1990’s and 2000’s were pretty 
quiet at -3.13% and 2.26% respectively. Overall, these results seem highly cyclical and decades 
of boom or bust appear to be dictated by large price trends over the time periods. While the risk 
premiums cycle above and below zero over the life of these contracts, it is interesting that the 
average over the entire period for all commodities is 0.64%, which is basically zero for all intents 
and purposes. This again shows that returns to commodities in general are on average zero over 
the long run and is consistent with previous studies. 
5.6 Non-Storable Commodities 
The analysis of the non-storable commodities is a bit different than the storables since the 
cost of carry    represents the cyclical component of non-storables instead of a cost of carry as 
these goods cannot be “carried.” The three commodity futures markets in this study which are 
viewed as non-storables include Lean Hogs, Live Cattle, and Feeder Cattle. The reason the 
spread between futures contracts does not represent a cost of carry with these commodities is 
they cannot be stored. Hogs are perishable (they are delivered as a carcass), and the cattle 
contracts have specific weights to be delivered and the window of eligibility is limited. Since an 
average of    is taken over time, the impact of any seasonalities in these commodities will cancel 
out, and    must be related to broader price cycles of the commodity, if any.  
Performance of non-storables is interesting and is shown in Table 7 for 2006-2012. A 
large positive    over this time period is suggestive of a cycle where prices are increasing over a 
long time frame. This is a result of how production occurs within these markets. It takes a season 
to grow and harvest corn for example; the livestock markets are different because it can take 
years to rebuild inventories. Harlow (1962) states duration of cycles can last over 4 years for 
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hogs and Tonsor (2011) explains that cattle cycles can last over 9 years.
39
 When inventory levels 
drop due to low demand or margin squeezes, they will eventually need to be rebuilt. The time it 
takes create supply sufficient to compensate for an increase in demand for animals can take 
substantial time and is dictated by the price in the market. In this scenario, a non-storable futures 
market can experience a “contango” for an extended period of time to influence producers of 
livestock to increase supplies. This is why these cycles can last so long.  
The results in Table 7 are interesting and suggestive of cyclical price activity in the 
futures market.    for feeder cattle is around 8% for the time period and live cattle at almost 
10%. However, lean hogs experienced a large positive cycle component of over 30% suggesting 
the market is in the midst of a strong cycle to rebuild supply. To demonstrate the production 
cycle over this time period Figure 13 shows the historical beef cattle inventory from 1920-2012. 
Shown in Figure 13 is a recent downturn in inventory which is reflective in the term structure 
shown in Table 7 suggesting higher prices by a positive average annualized   . The term 
structure is forecasting higher prices due to the lower inventories and producers should be 
incentivized to build inventory into the higher priced periods. It should be noted that production 
in livestock has more factors than price as a driving factor to produce. Margins and demand have 
a great impact on overall decisions for production.  
Also interesting is the comparison to ex post spot premiums to futures returns in these 
markets. Feeder cattle had a    of -2.5% with a -1% futures return, which is close to the 
relationships observed in the other markets. The story gets more interesting in live cattle with a 
   of -3% and a futures return of 4% which suggests that    was positive over this time period 
and large enough to influence the returns. The situation in lean hogs is the most interesting with 
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 Page 27 of this paper has additional information on the model of the hog cycle. 
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   at almost -24% with a futures return of -7%. This suggests that the majority of the moves in 
   were aggressively positive to reach the average     of over 30%. It would appear from this 
information that the lean hogs started their cyclical move sometime near the beginning of this 
sample period. This is an interesting observation which could lead to further investigation into 
this market.  
While the model is used for the cost of carry, it is shown here how it can be interpreted 
when applying to commodities which cannot be stored or carried. A simple change in 
interpretation of    from cost of carry to a cycle component is what is needed. Furthermore, it is 
interesting to see how volatile the cycle components are in these markets. The change in     
appears much more influential of futures returns here than in the storable commodities. 
5.7 Summary 
This chapter presented the results of the study with the accompanied discussion and 
interpretations of the results. First, the contango argument was dispelled and it is concluded that 
roll returns are not realized futures returns. Next, an explanation of the performance gap between 
the observed spot price of a commodity and the investment performance of a long futures 
investment was explained. The performance gap is simply due to the accumulation of the cost of 
carry in reported spot prices without accounting for the actual cost paid to storage. Investor 
performance was analyzed over a breakdown of the ETF time period from April 10, 2006 to 
December 31, 2012 and impacts of the financial crises were observed. The results show that the 
average annualized    across all commodities in this time period was basically zero. A test to 
study the consequence of financialization on risk premium in relation to Hamilton and Wu 
(2012) was performed. The results were not suggestive of flip in risk premium throughout all 
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markets; however, there was evidence of potential impacts in the energy sector. Furthermore, 
investor performance was extended to longer time periods and it was concluded that on average 
commodity futures investments have an ex post risk premium close to zero. This suggests 
investment returns are close to zero which is consistent with Sanders and Irwin (2012). Finally, 
the interpretation of the methodology as applied to non-storable commodities was then 
documented. Using a cost of carry model in non-storables is explained by interpreting the cost of 
carry calculation as a cyclical component.  
The returns investors have received have been disappointing over this time period. 
Expectations of investors to match the performance of the spot appreciation they benchmark as a 
target has been one source of this disappointment. It was shown how this is an invalid 
comparison and investors seem uninformed of the interworking of futures markets. Another 
source of disappointment appears to stem from the expectations created by previous academic 
research and the investment community (Gorton and Rouwenhourst 2006, Erb and Harvey 2006, 
Investment Bank Indexing). Apparently investors have had unrealistic expectations for the risk 
premium associated with commodity futures and their disappointment is derived from these 
expectations. As demonstrated, estimation for returns to long investments in individual 
commodities are, on average, near zero. Coupling a zero expected return with negative surprises 
during the financial crisis appears to be the source of investor pain in these long-only commodity 
investments.  
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6. CONCLUSION 
6.1 Summary and Review 
 This thesis set out to answer major questions regarding poor investor performance since 
the rapid increase in commodity investments over the last decade. The work herein suggests that 
efforts to extrapolate returns from static long-only investments will be futile as the returns on 
average are near zero. Investors venturing into the commodity futures space looking for an 
additional income generator by naively buying futures to collect a risk premium will be 
disappointed in the end result. Furthermore, investors in a futures strategy eyeing the spot price 
as a target for returns will come up short of their target in a contango environment due to the 
nature of the increase in reported spot prices as accumulated carrying costs. Overall, this thesis 
has documented and put to rest common misconceptions of commodity investment. 
 The work has successfully dismissed the contango argument as a reason for poor 
commodity investment performance and proved risk premium as the principal driver of futures 
returns. It was identified that the divergence between observed spot market returns and ETF 
returns in crude oil and individual long futures investment strategies is simply due to the 
accumulated carrying costs. After breaking down the futures returns for crude oil, corn, gold, and 
natural gas it was shown that ex post risk premium almost entirely explains the returns. The 
analysis was extended over 19 other commodities with the finding that the average risk premium 
is close to zero over the sample period as well as for the long run. Lastly, upon examining the 
financialization affects, it was found on average financialization has no impact on flipping risk 
premium. However, there is an interesting case in the energy sector where the opposite appears 
true.  
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6.2 Suggestions for Future Work 
 The findings in this thesis for impacts of financialization raise several interesting 
questions. Why is there a distinct difference in the effects of the financialization test between 
energy markets and non-energy markets? Is the change in risk premium associated with a 
massive influx of money into this sector or something different entirely? Why have risk 
premiums increased through the rest of the markets? Has there been an increase in hedging 
activities since higher volatility and prices have entered some of these markets in recent years? It 
is reasonable to think that a bidding away of risk premium due to large flows in to futures 
markets could have an opposite force associated with increased hedging activity and increasing 
risk premium to long futures holders. This would be something interesting to dig deeper into 
after this analysis. 
 An interesting question arose that was outside the scope of this paper in association with 
the GSCI Indexes. How are profits paid out to the holders of the GSCI Excess Return Index, the 
index that incorporates returns from roll yield? As documented in this paper, roll yields are not 
realized returns to investments. Furthermore, questions arise about the GSCI in general. How 
does the rebalancing affect investors? Are there issues around the index that investors should be 
aware of before investing? 
6.3 Concluding Remarks 
Commodity markets are very unique and should be looked at in a different light than 
traditional asset classes. Investors and players who enter this arena to gamble on price ought to 
know what they are doing and should not come in blindly because they’ve heard returns to 
passive long investments are a foregone conclusion. Furthermore, people should always be 
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weary of anything that sounds too good to be true, especially in capital markets. It is evident 
through the analysis that pitches to investors to jump in to commodities for income and 
diversification has been grossly overstated. Beyond the calls from academic research and others 
to enter these markets, a comparison of investment performance to a spot market as a benchmark 
appears silly after the investigation revealed targets of spot are generally unattainable. Moreover, 
blaming the mistakes of investors for entering these markets on market structures shows the lack 
of knowledge and foresight the investment community has within the futures market discipline. 
The returns investors received have been disappointing over this time period. 
Expectations of investors to match the performance of the spot appreciation they benchmark as a 
target has been one source of this disappointment. It has been shown how this is an invalid 
comparison and investors have been simply uninformed of the function on futures markets. 
Another source of disappointment appears to stem from the expectations created by previous 
academic research and the investment community (Gorton and Rouwenhourst 2006, Erb and 
Harvey 2006, Investment Bank Indexing). Apparently investors have had unrealistic expectations 
for the risk premium associated with commodity futures and their disappointment is driven from 
these expectations. 
The problems investors have had with these markets may have been avoidable by better 
understanding of the functions of commodity futures markets. It is apparent as a result of this 
study that the returns on average to long commodity positions are close to zero. An attempt to 
turn these markets into grounds for viable investments has resulted in torment and frustration in 
recent years. Just as you cannot squeeze blood from a turnip, you cannot naively squeeze passive 
returns from a long commodity investment as they simply do not exist.  
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FIGURES 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Commodity Investments 2005-2010 
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Figure 2: Closing NAV for USO (Crude Oil ETF) and WTI Crude Oil Implied Spot: April 
10, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
 
 
Figure 3: Closing Returns to Long Corn Investment Strategy and Corn Implied Spot: April 
10, 2006 – December 31, 2012  
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Figure 4: Hypothetical Pricing Curves and Risk Premium  
(Left: Contango, Right: Backwardation) 
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Figure 5: Difference of Implied Spot and Observed Spot as a Percentage of Observed Spot 
Price  
(From Top: Corn, Wheat, Soybeans) 
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Figure 6: Closing Return to Long Gold Investment Strategy and Gold Implied Spot: April 
10, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Closing Returns to Long Natural Gas Investment Strategy and Natural Gas 
Implied Spot: April 10, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
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Note: Cost of Carry is the accumulated addition of carry over the time period and the Gap is the log return of the 
spot price to the NAV of the USO 
 
Figure 8: Performance Gap between USO and WTI Crude Oil Implied Spot and 
Accumulated Cost of Storage 
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Figure 9: Hypothetical Commodity Curve Demonstrating Divergence (Contango) 
Note: Point A represents entry point for futures contract and point B the exit point. The 
appreciation to spot prices does not incorporate the cost to store the commodity, while futures 
effectively price in those charges. Futures return in this example is zero. The same is true for a 
market with inverse carrying charges (negative slope) only the spot price will be depreciating. 
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Figure 10: Hypothetical Commodity Curve Demonstrating Divergence (Backwardation) 
Note: Similar to Figure 9, only for a backwardated curve. Point A represents entry point for 
futures contract and point B the exit point. Futures return in this example is zero. The same is 
true for a market with inverse carrying charges (negative slope) only the spot price will be 
depreciating. 
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Figure 11: 12 Month Moving Average Daily Annualized Ut for Crude Oil and Corn: April 
10, 2006 – December 31, 2012  
(Top: WTI Crude Oil, Bottom: Corn) 
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Figure 12: 12 Month Moving Average Daily Annualized Ut for Gold and Natural Gas: 
April 10, 2006 – December 31, 2012  
(Top: Gold, Bottom: Natural Gas) 
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   Source: USDA-NASS 
 
 
Figure 13: January 1 Beef Cow Inventory 1920-2013. Adapted from “Agricultural Cycles: 
Livestock Market Assessment and Long Term Prospective (Beef Cattle and Hogs),” by L. 
Schulz, 2013, http://www.extension.iastate.edu/agdm/info/agcycles/schulz.pdf. 
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TABLES 
 
Note: Returns for the 25 largest futures-based funds as reported by ETF Database (http://etfdb.com/).  It does not 
include returns to leveraged funds, short funds, or funds that did not have a 5-year performance record. 
 
Table 1: Returns to Commodity-Linked Exchange Traded Funds, May 15, 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(millions) -----Total Return (%)-----
Symbol Name Assets 1 Year 3 Year 5 Year
DBC DB Commodity Index Tracking Fund 5,618 -1% 16% -33%
DJP Dow Jones-UBS Commodity Index TR ETN 1,738 -1% -1% -41%
DBA DB Agriculture Fund 1,663 -3% 8% -29%
USO United States Oil Fund 1,301 -6% -7% -67%
GSG GSCI Commodity-Indexed Trust Fund 1,072 -2% 6% -54%
UNG United States Natural Gas Fund LP 927 25% -64% -95%
RJI Rogers Intl Commodity ETN 632 0% 15% -35%
GCC Continuous Commodity Index Fund 453 -1% 8% -20%
DBO DB Oil Fund 439 -2% 3% -43%
OIL S&P GSCI Crude Oil Tot Ret Idx ETN 341 -5% -3% -70%
DBB DB Base Metals Fund 311 -11% -15% -32%
DBP DB Precious Metals Fund 265 -13% 9% 44%
DBE DB Energy Fund 195 1% 11% -42%
DGL DB Gold Fund 184 -11% 8% 47%
UCI E-TRACS UBS Bloomberg CMCI ETN 144 -1% 9% -24%
JJG DJ-UBS Grains Total Return Sub-Index ETN 113 15% 45% -19%
GSP S&P GSCI Total Return Index ETN 107 -2% 12% -53%
JJC DJ-UBS Copper Total Return Sub-Index ETN 105 -9% -6% -23%
JJA DJ-UBS Agriculture Subindex Total Return ETN 92 2% 35% -12%
RJN Rogers Intl Commodity Enrgy ETN 70 0% 8% -57%
GSC GS Connect S&P GSCI Enh Commodity TR ETN 67 -3% 10% -44%
GSC GS Connect S&P GSCI Enh Commodity TR ETN 67 -3% 10% -44%
UGA United States Gasoline Fund LP 59 9% 57% -5%
COW DJ-UBS Livestock Total Return Sub-Index ETN 53 -5% -15% -41%
RJZ Rogers Intl Commodity Metal ETN 49 -8% -7% -13%
Weighted Average 16,065 -1% 4% -40%
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Time m (m-n) 
  ( ) 
Nearby 
Futures (n) 
  ( ) 
Next 
Futures (m) 
   
Cost of 
Storage 
   
Implied Spot 
Price (t) 
   
   
Expected Spot 
Price (t+1) 
   
Ex Post 
Premium 
Change 
in Spot 
Price 
Change in 
Cost of 
Storage 
Change 
In 
Futures 
1 59 30 100.00 101.00 0.0332% 99.04 99.08 
    2 58 30 102.00 103.00 0.0325% 101.08 101.11 2.00% 2.03% -0.0006% 1.96% 
3 57 30 102.00 104.00 0.0647% 100.23 100.30 -0.87% -0.84% 0.0322% 0.97% 
4 56 30 101.00 101.00 0.0000% 101.00 101.00 0.70% 0.76% -0.0647% -2.93% 
5 55 30 100.00 99.00 -0.0335% 100.84 100.81 -0.16% -0.16% -0.0335% -2.00% 
 
 
Table 2: Hypothetical Calculation of Market Return  
(Daily Percentage Returns) 
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Variable WTI Crude Corn Gold Natural Gas 
Cost of Storage (  ) 14.1% 9.6% 2.0% 42.8% 
Ex Post Spot Premium (  ) -9.5% 6.3% 13.4% -53.0% 
Appreciation in Implied Spot (      ) 4.6% 15.9% 15.5% -10.2% 
Change in Cost of Storage [(   )  ] 2.9% 0.3% 0.9% 3.4% 
Futures Return (    (   )  ) -6.6% 6.6% 14.3% -49.5% 
     Theoretical Performance Gap (    (   )      ) 11.2% 9.3% 1.1% 39.4% 
     ETF Return -10.5% 5.2% 12.7% -50.1% 
     USO Actual Performance Gap 15.1%       
Note: the ETF returns are the actual returns for USO for crude oil.  For the other markets, it is a 
simulated return based on nearby futures returns and an annual expense ratio of 0.45%. 
 
Table 3: Average Annualized Return Components: April 10, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
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Table 4: Annualized Average Daily Ex Post Spot Premium (Ut) for All Commodities: April 
10, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
  
t-stat. t-stat. t-stat. t-stat.
WTI Crude Oil -0.61 0.65 -1.08 -0.23
Brent Crude Oil 0.07 0.78 -1.02 0.92
Heating Oil -0.13 0.57 -1.08 0.54
RBOB (Gasoline) 0.49 0.63 -0.68 1.18
Natural Gas -2.48 -1.11 -1.43 -1.80
Gold 1.63 0.72 0.82 1.30
Silver 0.75 0.03 0.36 0.86
Copper 0.31 0.56 -0.11 0.09
Corn 0.46 0.89 -1.03 0.82
CBOT Wheat -0.17 0.80 -1.23 -0.10
KCBT Wheat 0.09 0.86 -1.35 0.30
Soybeans 1.22 1.58 -0.09 0.94
Soybean Meal 1.67 1.27 0.62 1.04
Soybean Oil 0.45 1.66 -0.87 0.10
Rough Rice -0.15 1.28 -1.02 -0.68
Oats -0.14 0.83 -1.20 -0.03
Cotton -0.09 -0.67 -0.21 0.45
Cocoa 0.27 1.16 0.25 -0.85
Coffee -0.41 -0.03 -0.49 -0.23
Sugar 0.10 -1.08 1.33 0.06
Lean Hogs -1.64 -0.88 -1.41 -0.55
Live Cattle -0.46 -0.41 -1.29 0.62
Feeder Cattle -0.44 -0.37 -0.79 0.38
Average
-0.25% -3.62% 9.63% -1.98%
-9.85% -9.77% -31.26% -0.41%
2.68% -56.51% -1.56%
9.71% 7.82% 9.87% 11.15%
5.09% 22.53% -25.41% 4.78%
6.19%
2.81%
-0.70% 7.53% -22.24% 2.38%
Ex Post Spot Premium (Ut) for All Commodities: April 10, 2006-December 31, 2012
-59.71%
-21.92%
-12.17%
13.81%
-3.91%
20.88%
7.61%
-46.18%
1.47%
13.39%
18.59%
-15.04%
-4.19%
1.53%
9.78%
16.06%
5.70%
-2.13%
12.22%
15.80%
1.19%
-0.54%
-10.06%
-10.23%
22.43%
-21.01%
-13.41%
50.97%
-7.43%
-38.28%
-43.52%
-45.31%
-3.90%
23.38%
-28.30%
-42.02%
-25.33%
-49.56%
-62.01%
-35.66%
-46.14%
-89.19%
-5.01%
19.78%
14.84%
8.38%
-23.89%
-3.20%
-2.46%
14.70%
12.93%
15.49%
11.46%
-41.19%
12.81%
9.95%
0.70%
23.80%
-0.47%
-26.19%
-11.62%
18.96%
20.50%
20.66%
27.28%
24.62%
27.17%
18.62%
-4.67%
-3.63%
-4.71%
1.54%
-1.23%
6.29%
1.18%
-2.61%
14.37%
20.44%
4.57%
-1.97%
-1.54%
0.96%
-9.48%
7.72%
-1.71%
-52.96%
4.21%
13.44%
11.49%
3.40%
-11.09%
Commodity
ETF Sample Pre-Lehman Post-Lehman Post Crisis
04/10/06 to 12/31/12 04/10/06 to 08/29/08 09/02/08 to 12/31/09 01/04/10 to 12/31/12
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Table 5: Estimated Annualized Average Daily Ex Post Spot Risk Premiums: 1990 -2012 
 
 
1990-2012 1990-2004 2005-2012 Subsample
Market Average t-stat. Average t-stat. Average t-stat. Difference t-stat.
WTI Crude Oil 5.9% 0.71 11.6% 1.11 -4.8% -0.35 -16.4% -0.96
Brent Crude Oil 11.5% 1.50 13.3% 1.35 8.4% 0.68 -4.9% -0.31
Heating Oil 3.9% 0.48 4.7% 0.45 2.4% 0.20 -2.4% -0.15
RBOB Gasoline 17.6% 1.44 27.1% 1.31 11.8% 0.78 -15.3% -0.61
Natural Gas -21.0% -1.69 -6.5% -0.40 -46.2% -2.38 -39.7% -1.59
3.6% 10.0% -5.7% -15.7%
Gold 3.3% 0.97 -2.8% -0.80 14.7% 2.03 17.5% 2.18
Silver 4.4% 0.72 -2.3% -0.37 16.8% 1.26 19.1% 1.31
Copper 7.4% 1.26 4.7% 0.75 12.5% 1.03 7.8% 0.57
5.0% -0.1% 14.7% 14.8%
Corn -5.5% -0.98 -10.6% -1.82 4.0% 0.33 14.6% 1.09
CBOT Wheat -6.3% -0.96 -8.1% -1.11 -3.1% -0.23 5.0% 0.33
KCBT Wheat 0.6% 0.10 -1.2% -0.19 3.9% 0.33 5.1% 0.38
Soybeans 4.8% 0.91 1.4% 0.24 11.2% 1.06 9.8% 0.81
Soybean Meal 10.5% 1.85 6.8% 1.06 17.4% 1.58 10.7% 0.84
Soybean Oil -0.5% -0.09 -2.9% -0.52 4.2% 0.45 7.1% 0.65
Rough Rice -7.0% -1.19 -9.8% -1.29 -1.8% -0.19 8.0% 0.68
Oats -3.7% -0.49 -5.2% -0.56 -0.8% -0.06 4.4% 0.28
-0.9% -3.7% 4.4% 8.1%
Cotton -5.7% -0.91 -8.3% -1.15 -0.9% -0.07 7.5% 0.54
Cocoa -3.5% -0.51 -6.0% -0.71 1.2% 0.11 7.2% 0.51
Coffee -4.8% -0.58 -4.5% -0.40 -5.2% -0.47 -0.7% -0.04
Sugar 5.1% 0.64 3.2% 0.33 8.6% 0.61 5.4% 0.32
-2.2% -3.9% 0.9% 4.9%
Feeder Cattle 5.2% 1.84 8.4% 2.47 -0.8% -0.15 -9.2% -1.50
Live Cattle 1.8% 0.47 4.3% 0.87 -2.7% -0.42 -7.0% -0.87
Lean Hogs -14.0% -1.8 -6.0% -0.62 -29.0% -2.23 -23.1% -1.43
-2.3% 2.2% -10.8% -13.1%
All 0.2% 0.10 -0.3% -0.17 1.0% 0.38 1.2% 0.37
Note: RBOB Gasoline data start in January, 2000 and natural gas data start in 1991
Estimated Ex Post Spot Risk Premiums: 1990-2012
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Note: Natural Gas data start in 1991 
 
Table 6: Annualized Average Daily Ex Post Risk Premium by Individual Commodity 
Futures Market: 1960 - 2010  
Commodity 1960's 1970's 1980's 1990's 2000's All T-stat P-Value
Brent Oil 8.61% 10.34% 9.47% 1.19 0.2345
Crude Oil 5.20% 8.95% 7.08% 0.71 0.4748
RBOB (Gasoline) 16.99% 16.99% 1.22 0.2210
Heating Oil 10.10% -3.99% 10.36% 5.49% 0.82 0.4097
Natural Gas -8.70% -25.09% -16.90% -1.43 0.1529
10.10% 0.28% 4.31% 4.43%
Gold -11.13% -7.03% 10.43% -2.58% -0.57 0.5684
Silver -27.10% -4.23% 8.24% -7.70% -0.98 0.3268
Copper -0.23% 2.40% 14.22% 5.46% 1.13 0.2586
-12.82% -2.96% 10.96% -1.60%
Corn -6.37% 4.44% -7.70% -8.15% -9.56% -5.47% -1.40 0.1607
CBOT Wheat -5.30% 12.09% -3.68% -7.13% -6.93% -2.19% -0.43 0.6651
KCBT Wheat 11.36% 0.57% -0.52% -0.26% 2.79% 0.90 0.3701
Soybeans 4.94% 10.39% -6.54% -2.58% 9.87% 3.22% 1.03 0.3044
Soybean Meal 12.28% 3.45% -2.17% 1.47% 17.79% 6.56% 1.54 0.1238
Soybean Oil 7.18% 28.84% -7.52% -5.11% 3.40% 5.36% 1.46 0.1431
Rough Rice -7.92% -5.64% -6.78% -1.13 0.2579
Oats -6.30% 5.32% -4.28% -16.69% 8.58% -2.68% -0.49 0.6215
1.07% 10.84% -4.47% -5.83% 2.15% 0.10%
Cotton -4.67% 8.44% 1.67% -3.32% -13.17% -2.21% -0.13 0.8937
Cocoa -8.18% 29.18% -17.25% -14.53% 11.01% -0.24% -0.05 0.9572
Coffee -6.14% 3.59% -13.83% -5.46% -0.46 0.6461
Sugar 17.35% -18.10% -4.43% 15.63% 2.61% 0.47 0.6366
-6.42% 18.32% -9.96% -4.67% -0.09% -1.32%
Feeder Cattle 2.91% 6.64% 4.66% 4.74% 1.85 0.0639
Live Cattle 8.11% 6.87% 2.37% -0.02% 4.33% 1.46 0.1443
Lean Hogs 9.86% 1.34% -4.86% -23.95% -4.40% -0.79 0.4290
8.98% 3.71% 1.38% -6.43% 1.56%
Average -0.80% 12.40% -4.91% -3.13% 2.26% 0.58%
84 
 
 
Variable Feeder Cattle Live Cattle Lean Hogs 
Cycle Return (  ) 8.16% 9.87% 30.68% 
Ex Post Spot Premium (  ) -2.46% -3.20% -23.89% 
Appreciation in Implied Spot (  +  ) 5.70% 6.67% 6.79% 
Futures Return (    (   )  ) -0.92% 4.05% -7.01% 
 
Table 7: Non-Storable Average Annualized Return Components: April 10, 2006 to 
December 31, 2012 
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APPENDIX A – Spot Performance and Long Strategy Performance 
This appendix includes the figures for the remaining 19 commodities not displayed in the figures 
section. The importance of this section is to show graphically the performance of the long futures 
investment strategies against the implied spot performance for all the remaining commodities in 
the study over the sample period: April 10, 2006 - December 31, 2012. 
 
 
Figure 14: Closing Returns to Long Brent Investment Strategy and Brent Implied Spot: 
April 10, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
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Figure 15: Closing Returns to Long Brent Investment Strategy and Brent Implied Spot: 
April 10, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
 
 
Figure 16: Closing Returns to Long Heating Oil Investment Strategy and Heating Oil 
Implied Spot: April 10, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
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Figure 17: Closing Returns to Long Copper Investment Strategy and Copper Implied Spot: 
April 10, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
 
 
 
Figure 18: Closing Returns to Long Silver Investment Strategy and Silver Implied Spot: 
April 10, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
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Figure 19: Closing Returns to Long Cocoa Investment Strategy and Cocoa Implied Spot: 
April 10, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
 
 
Figure 20: Closing Returns to Long Coffee Investment Strategy and Coffee Implied Spot: 
April 10, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
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Figure 21: Closing Returns to Long Sugar Investment Strategy and Sugar Implied Spot: 
April 10, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
 
 
Figure 22: Closing Returns to Long Cotton Investment Strategy and Cotton Implied Spot: 
April 10, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
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Figure 23: Closing Returns to Long KCBT Wheat Investment Strategy and KCBT Wheat 
Implied Spot: April 10, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
 
 
 
Figure 24: Closing Returns to Long CBOT Wheat Investment Strategy and CBOT Wheat 
Implied Spot: April 10, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
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Figure 25: Closing Returns to Long Soybean Investment Strategy and Soybean Implied 
Spot: April 10, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
 
Figure 26: Closing Returns to Long Soybean Meal Investment Strategy and Soybean Meal 
Implied Spot: April 10, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
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Figure 27: Closing Returns to Long Soybean Oil Investment Strategy and Soybean Oil 
Implied Spot: April 10, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
 
 
Figure 28: Closing Returns to Long Oats Investment Strategy and Oats Implied Spot: 
April 10, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
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Figure 29: Closing Returns to Long Rough Rice Investment Strategy and Rough Rice 
Implied Spot: April 10, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
 
 
Figure 30: Closing Returns to Long Live Cattle Investment Strategy and Live Cattle 
Implied Spot: April 10, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
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Figure 31: Closing Returns to Long Feeder Cattle Investment Strategy and Feeder Cattle 
Implied Spot: April 10, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
 
 
Figure 32: Closing Returns to Long Lean Hogs Investment Strategy and Lean Hogs 
Implied Spot: April 10, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
95 
 
APPENDIX B – Average Ex Post Spot Premium Performance Over ETF Sample Period 
This appendix includes the figures for the remaining 19 commodities not displayed in the figures 
section. The importance of this section is to show graphically the performance of the ex post spot 
premium for all remaining commodities in the study over the sample period: April 10, 2006 - 
December 31, 2012. 
 
Figure 33: 12 Month Moving Average of Daily Annualized Ex Post Spot Premium (Ut) for 
Brent: April 10, 2006 – December 31, 2012
  
Figure 34: 12 Month Moving Average of Daily Annualized Ex Post Spot Premium (Ut) for 
Gasoline: April 10, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
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Figure 35: 12 Month Moving Average of Daily Annualized Ex Post Spot Premium (Ut) for 
Heating Oil: April 10, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
 
Figure 36: 12 Month Moving Average of Daily Annualized Ex Post Spot Premium (Ut) for 
Copper: April 10, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
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Figure 37: 12 Month Moving Average of Daily Annualized Ex Post Spot Premium (Ut) for 
Silver: April 10, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
 
Figure 38: 12 Month Moving Average of Daily Annualized Ex Post Spot Premium (Ut) for 
Cocoa: April 10, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
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Figure 39: 12 Month Moving Average of Daily Annualized Ex Post Spot Premium (Ut) for 
Coffee: April 10, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
 
Figure 40: 12 Month Moving Average of Daily Annualized Ex Post Spot Premium (Ut) for 
Sugar: April 10, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
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Figure 41: 12 Month Moving Average of Daily Annualized Ex Post Spot Premium (Ut) for 
Cotton: April 10, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
 
Figure 42: 12 Month Moving Average of Daily Annualized Ex Post Spot Premium (Ut) for 
KCBT Wheat: April 10, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
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Figure 43: 12 Month Moving Average of Daily Annualized Ex Post Spot Premium (Ut) for 
CBOT Wheat: April 10, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
 
Figure 44: 12 Month Moving Average of Daily Annualized Ex Post Spot Premium (Ut) for 
Soybeans: April 10, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
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Figure 45: 12 Month Moving Average of Daily Annualized Ex Post Spot Premium (Ut) for 
Soybean Meal: April 10, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
 
Figure 46: 12 Month Moving Average of Daily Annualized Ex Post Spot Premium (Ut) for 
Soybean Oil: April 10, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
102 
 
 
Figure 47: 12 Month Moving Average of Daily Annualized Ex Post Spot Premium (Ut) for 
Oats: April 10, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
 
Figure 48: 12 Month Moving Average of Daily Annualized Ex Post Spot Premium (Ut) for 
Rough Rice: April 10, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
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Figure 49: 12 Month Moving Average of Daily Annualized Ex Post Spot Premium (Ut) for 
Feeder Cattle: April 10, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
 
Figure 50: 12 Month Moving Average of Daily Annualized Ex Post Spot Premium (Ut) for 
Lean Hogs: April 10, 2006 – December 31, 2012 
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Figure 51: 12 Month Moving Average of Daily Annualized Ex Post Spot Premium (Ut) for 
Live Cattle: April 10, 2006 – December 31, 2012
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APPENDIX C – GSCI Holdings 2013 
 
Contracts Included in the S&P GSCI for 2013 
 
Trading 
Facility 
 
Commodity 
 
(1) 
Ticker 
 
2012 CPW 
 
2013 CPW 
 
2013 ACRP ($) 
 
Unit 
 
(2) 
2012 PDW 
 
2013 RPDW 
 
2013 TDVT 
(USD bn) 
 
2013 TVM 
Designated Contract 
Expirations at Month Begin
(3) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
CBT Chicago Wheat W 18217.58 19699.65 6.944 bu 3.04% 3.22% 913.8 123.3 H H K K N N U U Z Z Z H 
KBT Kansas Wheat KW 5004.071 3922.031 7.342 bu 0.88% 0.68% 192.4 123.3 H H K K N N U U Z Z Z H 
CBT Corn C 29648.15 30371.03 6.549 bu 4.66% 4.69% 2540.2 235.7 H H K K N N U U Z Z Z H 
CBT Soybeans S 8037.317 8163.838 13.607 bu 2.63% 2.62% 3553 590.4 H H K K N N X X X X F F 
ICE - US Coffee KC 17406.22 17554.97 1.975 lbs 0.83% 0.82% 434.8 231.4 H H K K N N U U Z Z Z H 
ICE - US Sugar #11 SB 344724.8 341991.6 0.229 lbs 1.90% 1.85% 662 155.7 H H K K N N V V V H H H 
ICE - US Cocoa CC 4.116321 4.100944 2345.083 MT 0.23% 0.23% 137.2 263.4 H H K K N N U U Z Z Z H 
ICE - US Cotton #2 CT 53411.21 52490.38 0.869 lbs 1.12% 1.07% 249.9 101.1 H H K K N N Z Z Z Z Z H 
CME Lean Hogs LH 72823.44 76883.59 0.872 lbs 1.52% 1.58% 394.1 108.5 G J J M M N Q V V Z Z G 
CME Live Cattle LC 92591.82 91280.08 1.221 lbs 2.71% 2.62% 692 114.6 G J J M M Q Q V V Z Z G 
CME Feeder Cattle FC 13596.46 14819.78 1.497 lbs 0.49% 0.52% 137.8 114.6 H H J K Q Q Q U V X F F 
NYM / ICE Crude Oil CL 13557.23 11033.01 95.087 bbl 30.96% 24.71% 17858.9 314.2 G H J K M N Q U V X Z F 
NYM Heating Oil HO 71569.8 87775.28 2.986 gal 5.13% 6.17% 4461.4 314.2 G H J K M N Q U V X Z F 
NYM RBOB Gasoline RB 73694.1 88342.87 2.837 gal 5.02% 5.90% 4266.2 314.2 G H J K M N Q U V X Z F 
ICE - UK Brent Crude Oil LCO 6959.701 8638.79 109.773 bbl 18.35% 22.34% 16143.1 314.2 H J K M N Q U V X Z F G 
ICE - UK Gasoil LGO 359.2745 386.9597 939.521 MT 8.11% 8.56% 6188.9 314.2 G H J K M N Q U V X Z F 
NYM / ICE Natural Gas NG 28984.31 29450.21 2.910 MMBtu 2.03% 2.02% 4275.2 920.7 G H J K M N Q U V X Z F 
LME Aluminum MAL 42.53 43.64 2071.229 MT 2.12% 2.13% 3200.5 653.5 G H J K M N Q U V X Z F 
LME Copper MCU 17.14 17.7 7873.938 MT 3.24% 3.28% 7305.5 967.5 G H J K M N Q U V X Z F 
LME Lead MPB 7.872 8.28 2031.708 MT 0.38% 0.40% 650.2 713.3 G H J K M N Q U V X Z F 
LME Nickel MNI 1.352 1.376 17810.750 MT 0.58% 0.58% 1053.2 793.2 G H J K M N Q U V X Z F 
LME Zinc MZN 11.04 11.12 1952.000 MT 0.52% 0.51% 1299.4 1104.9 G H J K M N Q U V X Z F 
CMX Gold GC 76.58309 76.77599 1660.250 oz 3.05% 3.00% 7571.1 1096.3 G J J M M Q Q Z Z Z Z G 
CMX Silver SI 665.5205 676.4518 30.940 oz 0.49% 0.49% 2072.6 1827.7 H H K K N N U U Z Z Z H 
 
(1) Tickers are Reuters RIC Codes. 
(2) Using the ACRP’s for the 2012 Annual Calculation Period. 
(3) Future Months included in the S&P GSCI at the beginning of each calendar month, starting with January 2013. Table 3 contains Month 
letter codes. 
 
Abbreviations:  
bbl   Barrels lbs  Pounds bu  Bushel MMBtu    Million British Thermal Units 
gal   U.S. Gallons oz.  Troy Ounces kg  Kilograms MT          Metric Tons 
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APPENDIX D – Cost of Carry and Change in Cost of Carry Tables 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Average Annualized Estimated Cost of Storage: 1990-2012 
 
t-stat. t-stat. t-stat.
WTI Crude Oil 1.38 1.36 0.26
Brent Crude Oil -10.19 -22.37 21.58
Heating Oil 2.59 -5.63 31.04
RBOB (Gasoline) -9.74 -13.8 -9.74
Natural Gas 27.27 12.83 31.38
Gold 122.43 121.65 53.07
Silver 116.65 112.97 55.59
Copper -17.72 -14.61 -10.12
Corn 45.29 30.85 38.34
CBOT Wheat 36 15.6 98.71
KCBT Wheat 10.18 -0.76 45.27
Soybeans -2.66 -4.2 2.15
Soybean Meal -18.3 -16.2 -8.81
Soybean Oil 39.72 20.44 86.99
Rough Rice 33.13 20.97 50.32
Oats 20.74 11.47 28.62
Cotton 24.12 17.66 16.65
Cocoa 57.27 56.45 21.26
Coffee 37.61 21.91 82.12
Sugar -12.55 -17.5 2.15
Feeder Cattle -13.01 -27.7 15.44
Live Cattle 1.17 -9.49 18.61
Lean Hogs 18.15 6.81 20.46
Average
3.41% -2.33% 9.80%
1.05%
-7.07%
2.38%
Market
1990-2012 1990-2004 2005-2012
Average Average Average
7.58%
4.53% 3.08% 7.26%
10.24%
7.31%
-6.80%
4.79%
2.33%
-0.76%
3.80% 1.29% 7.57%
-2.86% -7.14% 5.25%
4.01% -1.42% 14.27%
14.58%
0.32%
-3.35% -5.67% 0.97%
4.46% 3.99% 5.32%
7.38%
-2.84%
6.22%
8.80%
0.45%
6.96%
9.19%
-7.07%
2.27%
2.35%
14.92%
10.33% 9.48% 11.93%
-2.14% -2.37% -1.71%
1.44% 1.69% 0.97%
2.98%
3.48%
23.55% 14.41% 39.46%
3.62%
-7.53%
-1.62%
-0.25%
7.48%
3.50%
9.34%
7.35%
30.21%6.26%
-3.39%
6.63%
9.46%
5.55%
7.20%
0.85%
-5.44%
6.99%
11.43%
10.19%
3.40%
5.53%
4.09%
3.36%
-17.98%
-3.32%
-8.17%
5.79%
9.61%
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Table 9: Average Annualized Estimated Change in Cost of Storage: 1990-2012 
  
t-stat. t-stat. t-stat.
WTI Crude Oil 0.39 -0.3 1.19
Brent Crude Oil 1.89 1.78 0.65
Heating Oil 2.12 2.34 -0.75
RBOB (Gasoline) 0.81 0.58 0.81
Natural Gas 1.82 1.69 0.7
Gold 6.02 4.84 3.97
Silver 6.29 5.22 3.62
Copper 1.21 0.05 2.44
Corn 1.38 1.36 0.26
CBOT Wheat 1.58 1.24 1.25
KCBT Wheat 1.29 1.01 0.87
Soybeans 1.61 1.25 1.01
Soybean Meal 1.04 0.68 0.84
Soybean Oil 3.37 2.6 2.31
Rough Rice 1.55 1.22 1.13
Oats 2.63 2.2 1.53
Cotton -0.37 -0.09 -0.58
Cocoa 0.29 -0.06 0.54
Coffee 2.18 1.75 1.78
Sugar -0.56 -0.26 -0.67
Feeder Cattle -0.17 -0.59 0.5
Live Cattle 2.1 1.33 1.78
Lean Hogs 2.26 1.38 1.91
Average
Market
1990-2012 1990-2004 2005-2012
2.31% 3.09% 0.88%
4.05% 6.69% -0.88%
Average Average Average
1.24% 1.42% 0.89%
3.30% 4.28% 1.91%
3.03% 4.07% 3.03%
6.48% 8.19% 3.48%
3.25% 3.71% 2.41%
2.00% 2.13% 1.76%
1.19% 0.99% 1.54%
2.63% 2.77% 2.37%
3.90% 4.39% 2.99%
2.88% 2.68% 3.27%
1.78% 1.42% 2.43%
-0.72% -0.24% -1.63%
0.28% -0.07% 0.95%
7.08% 8.27% 4.93%
3.24% 3.60% 2.58%
0.34% 0.68% -0.30%
3.47% 4.11% 2.29%
-1.68% -1.08% -2.81%
5.77% 4.06% 8.97%
2.81% 2.96% 2.63%
4.90% 3.93% 6.73%
12.67% 9.39% 18.77%
-1.14%-0.27%
2.38%
1.00%
1.33%
0.65%
1.40%
0.45%
2.73%
0.99%
3.05%-0.64%
1.51%
0.05%
3.40%
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Table 10: Annualized Averages for Daily Cost of Carry for Individual Commodity Futures 
Markets: 1960 -2010 
  
Commodity 1960's 1970's 1980's 1990's 2000's All T-stat P-Value
Brent Oil -6.53% 0.59% -2.51% -8.24 0.0000
Crude Oil -3.56% 2.15% -0.71% -1.69 0.0912
RBOB (Gasoline) -6.03% -6.03% -6.81 0.0000
Heating Oil -7.47% 0.25% 0.85% -1.53% -4.22 0.0000
Natural Gas 10.29% 33.86% 22.67% 23.06 0.0000
-7.47% 0.11% 6.28% 2.38%
Gold 8.42% 3.74% 2.92% 5.04% 124.98 0.0000
Silver 10.18% 4.74% 3.05% 6.00% 68.31 0.0000
Copper 0.45% -4.74% -0.63% -1.64% -10.45 0.0000
6.35% 1.25% 1.78% 3.13%
Corn 7.02% 4.06% 6.01% 6.50% 16.71% 8.06% 52.13 0.0000
CBOT Wheat 1.96% -1.23% 3.57% 1.06% 14.84% 4.04% 20.59 0.0000
KCBT Wheat 0.10% -0.75% -4.38% 7.04% 0.50% 2.75 0.0060
Soybeans -3.50% -0.91% 5.36% 0.57% -1.79% -0.05% -0.24 0.8103
Soybean Meal -9.16% 4.58% 2.15% -3.59% -10.18% -3.24% -13.17 0.0000
Soybean Oil -5.36% -19.37% 5.10% 3.46% 5.97% -2.03% -9.8 0.0000
Rough Rice 4.26% 16.09% 10.17% 28.84 0.0000
Oats 3.81% 3.60% 3.95% 13.38% 0.92% 5.14% 23.8 0.0000
-0.87% -1.31% 3.63% 2.66% 6.20% 2.82%
Cotton 0.70% 2.13% -2.16% 0.00% 17.33% 3.59% 17.46 0.0000
Cocoa 10.74% -16.02% 5.69% 13.26% 3.00% 3.35% 21.23 0.0000
Coffee -2.78% 1.03% 14.70% 4.30% 21.11 0.0000
Sugar 0.12% 16.03% -3.47% 0.05% 3.20% 14.87 0.0000
5.72% -4.59% 4.20% 2.71% 8.77% 3.61%
Feeder Cattle -2.54% -6.65% -3.53% -4.24% -21.93 0.0000
Live Cattle 0.57% -5.55% -3.76% 2.28% -1.62% -6.79 0.0000
Lean Hogs -5.67% 0.55% 2.22% 25.51% 5.63% 10.23 0.0000
-2.55% -2.51% -2.73% 8.09% -0.08%
Average 0.78% -2.34% 2.57% 1.28% 6.33% 2.53%
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Table 11: Annualized Averages for Daily Change in Cost of Carry for Individual 
Commodity Futures Markets: 1960 -2010 
Commodity 1960's 1970's 1980's 1990's 2000's All T-stat P-Value
Brent Oil 3.37% 0.98% 1.97% 1.5 0.1337
Crude Oil -2.31% 3.29% 0.48% 0.25 0.8026
RBOB (Gasoline) 2.19% 2.19% 0.49 0.6242
Heating Oil 4.52% 6.71% 2.61% 4.19% 2.51 0.0121
Natural Gas 11.26% 3.63% 7.25% 1.79 0.0736
4.52% 4.76% 2.54% 3.22%
Gold 3.32% 1.49% 1.46% 2.09% 6.77 0.0000
Silver 1.24% 1.58% 1.18% 1.33% 1.2 0.2303
Copper 0.92% -0.04% 2.12% 1.00% 1.05 0.2938
1.83% 1.01% 1.59% 1.47%
Corn 4.82% 3.66% 5.84% 3.62% 2.04% 4.00% 2.74 0.0062
CBOT Wheat 3.11% 1.01% -1.66% 4.85% 1.07% 1.68% 1 0.3174
KCBT Wheat 1.27% 1.22% 2.30% 1.93% 1.68% 1.21 0.2264
Soybeans 2.84% 1.17% 2.60% 4.17% 2.28% 2.61% 2.02 0.0435
Soybean Meal 4.37% 4.58% 2.15% -3.59% -10.18% -3.24% -13.17 0.0000
Soybean Oil 2.97% -0.73% 4.85% 4.12% 1.73% 2.59% 2.61 0.0091
Rough Rice 5.29% 3.50% 4.39% 1.54 0.1237
Oats 4.37% 1.15% 5.40% 5.78% 9.61% 5.26% 3.3 0.0010
3.75% 1.73% 2.91% 3.32% 1.50% 2.37%
Cotton 0.67% -4.04% 4.72% -0.25% -0.95% 0.03% 0.01 0.9920
Cocoa 1.34% -0.89% 1.24% 1.59% -0.87% 0.49% 0.52 0.6031
Coffee 1.35% 3.37% 4.19% 2.99% 1.8 0.0720
Sugar -11.70% -10.79% 2.76% -7.28% -6.76% -2.72 0.0066
1.01% -5.54% -0.87% 1.87% -1.23% -0.81%
Feeder Cattle -1.01% -1.55% -0.21% -0.92% -0.61 0.5419
Live Cattle 2.82% 5.42% 2.98% 5.79% 4.28% 2.42 0.0156
Lean Hogs 17.33% 17.77% 5.62% 18.18% 14.72% 3.8 0.0001
10.08% 7.39% 2.35% 7.92% 6.03%
Average 3.06% 1.30% 2.95% 3.08% 2.20% 2.51%
